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Abstract
In this thesis we model the diffusion of information on social networks. A game
played on a specific type of graph generator, the iterated local transitivity
model, is examined. We study how the dynamics of the game change as the
graph grows, and the relationship between properties of the game on a graph
initially and properties of the game later in the graph’s development. We
show that, given certain conditions, for the iterated local transitivity model
it is possible to predict the existence of a Nash equilibrium at any point in
the graph’s growth. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash
Equilibria on star graphs, cliques and trees. We give some results on potential
games on the iterated local transitivity model.
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to graph properties, and describes vari-
ous early graph models. Chapter 3 describes some models for online social
networks, and introduces the iterated local transitivity model which we use
later in the thesis. In Chapter 4 various models for games played on networks
are examined. We study a model for competitive information diffusion on
star graphs, cliques and trees, and we provide conditions for the existence of
Nash Equilibria on these. This model for competitive information diffusion is
studied in detail for the iterated local transitivity model in Chapter 5. We
discuss potential games in Chapter 6 and their existence on the iterated local
transitivity model. We conclude with some suggestions on how to extend and
develop upon the work done in this thesis.
vii

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Recent advances in communications and the emergence of social networking
sites such as Facebook and Twitter [29] have greatly increased the power of
individual agents to disseminate information. This provides strong motivation
for analysing the mechanisms of information propagation and the role played
by the individual in the process. We approach this problem by modelling the
structure of the network of individuals as a graph and using game theoretic
concepts to capture the process of information diffusion. Thus the two central
mathematical themes of the thesis are graph theory and game theory.
Graphs have been the subject of study for many years [44]. The study of graph
theory began with Euler in 1735. He wrote a paper that is regarded as the first
in the history of graph theory [23]. There had been a long standing problem
in the city of Königsberg, of finding a walk through the city, consisting of four
landmasses and seven bridges, which would cross each bridge exactly once. A
map of the area is given below, with the river in blue, the bridges in green
and the landmasses numbered. Euler rewrote the problem in abstract terms,
representing the bridges as edges and the landmasses as vertices, as shown
below. The structure shown below is called a graph or network, with vertices
in blue that are connected by edges.
Graphs have since been used in many areas, in modelling relations in physical,
biological and social systems, such as connections between people, the internet,
food webs, metabolic networks, neural networks and many more.
1
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Figure 1.1: Map of Königsberg
Figure 1.2: Graph representation of Königsberg
Game theory is the study of strategic decision making. It is useful because
many human activities can be viewed as games on a network in which a
person’s utility is determined by the behaviour of others that are in some
sense nearby. Complex behaviour can emerge as local changes in a network
may have global effects. Game theory was first used to model how human
populations behaved. It is now employed in many fields such as economics,
political science, computer science and biology. A classic example of a game is
the prisoner’s dilemma. There are two players in this game, each of which can
choose either to cooperate or to defect. Both players gain if they cooperate,
but if only one cooperates then the one that defects will gain more. If both
defect both gain very little. A diagram of the payoffs each player receives is
given below.
Sociologists realised in the 1930s the importance of patterns of connections
between people in understanding our society. They discovered many of the
2
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Figure 1.3: Prisoner’s dilemma
small scale properties of graphs that are familiar today. However at this
time it was difficult to collect much data as typical studies would involve the
circulation of questionnaires, which is labour intensive.
Understanding social networks is important in epidemiology, behavioural sci-
ences, marketing and many other areas. Social networks are self organizing
and complex. In the last twenty years online social networks have become
part of the fabric of our lives. Websites such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace,
LinkedIn and Bebo have received a huge number of page views. They are
used daily by millions of people and the data generated by these networks
have made it possible to study social networks on a large scale. Datasets
involving millions of vertices, rather than fewer than a hundred, are now anal-
ysed. This required new techniques for analyzing the data, as there are too
many vertices for information to be obtained in an ad hoc manner from a
picture of the graph. Different properties of the graph become important, as
individual vertices are no longer relevant. It has also become necessary to cre-
ate graph generators, that can replicate properties of real world graphs. This
makes it possible to run simulations and can provide insight into the processes
that cause various graph properties to emerge. Ideally a graph generator is
simple, fast, realistic, and requires few input parameters.
In this thesis a game played on a specific type of graph generator is examined.
The game models information dissemination. We study how the dynamics of
the game changes as the graph grows, and the relationship between properties
of the game on the graph initially and properties of the game after the graph
3
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has grown. We look for the existence of Nash Equilibria on the initial graph
and then on the later graph. For the graph generator we chose, given certain
conditions, it is possible to predict the existence of a Nash equilibrium at any
point of the graph’s growth, once the initial graph has been examined. A Nash
Equilibrium is a solution concept of a game in which no player can increase
its payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy, and each player is aware of
the other players strategies. We give some results on potential games on this
graph model.
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to graph properties, and describes various
early graph models. Chapter 3 describes some models for online social net-
works, and introduces the iterated local transitivity model which we use later
in the thesis. In Chapter 4 various models for games played on networks are
examined. We study a model for competitive information diffusion on star
graphs, cliques and trees, and we provide conditions for the existence of Nash
Equilibria on these. These results have been submitted to Information Pro-
cessing Letters. This model for competitive information diffusion is studied
in detail for the iterated local transitivity model in Chapter 5. The results
from this chapter have been submitted to Discrete Applied Mathematics. We
discuss potential games in Chapter 6 and their existence on the iterated local
transitivity model. We conclude with some suggestions on how to extend and
develop upon the work done in this thesis.
4
CHAPTER 2
Background
In this chapter we provide some important basic definitions and concepts used
in graph theory. As the networks studied became larger, it became impossible
to examine their graphs using the naked eye, thus it became necessary to
develop different methods of analyzing them. Numerous different measures
have been developed over the years to characterize the structure and behaviour
of networks, some of which we look at here. We examine three early models
for generating graphs, each of which captures different properties of real world
graphs.
2.1 Definitions
Some basic terms used in graph theory are defined below. Many definitions in
graph theory have unfortunately not yet been standardized, so it is important
to be aware of possible differences in meaning between sources. For the most
part the definitions given in Newman’s review paper [44] are followed here.
An undirected graph is a graph consisting of a set of vertices V (G) and a
set of undirected edges E(G) of the form {v, w}, for v, w ∈ V (G). There may
be more than one edge between any two vertices, and there may be an edge
that connects a vertex to itself. To simplify notation we write vw (or wv) to
denote the edge {v, w} [44]. The graph G in Figure 2.1 is undirected.
A directed graph is a graph consisting of a set of vertices V (G) and a set
5
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of directed edges E(G) of the form (v, w), where (v, w) is an ordered pair and
v, w ∈ V (G) [44].
A loop is an edge that connects a vertex to itself.
A simple graph is an undirected graph that has no loops and no more than
one edge between any two vertices. Graph G in Figure 2.1 is simple.
The degree of a vertex v, degG(v), is the number of edges incident to the
vertex, with loops counted twice [44]. The degree of vertex 10 in the graph G
below is four.
Figure 2.1: An undirected graph G
A walk is sequence of vertices and edges v0, e1, v1, e2, v2...en, vn such that for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, the edge ei links vertices vi−1 and vi. The length of a walk is the
number of edges in the path, counting multiple edges multiple times. The
length of the walk 13, 12, 11, 8, 10 is four.
A path is a sequence of vertices and distinct edges such that from each of
its vertices there is an edge to the next vertex in the sequence, and no vertices
other than the first and last may be repeated. The walk 13, 12, 11, 8, 10 on the
graph above is an example of a path. A cycle is a closed path, a sequence of
distinct vertices and edges that starts and terminates at the same vertex [37].
10, 8, 12 is an example of a cycle in the graph above.
6
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A geodesic path is a shortest path from one vertex to another [44]. The geodesic
path between 12, 14 is 12, 8, 14. The diameter of a graph is the length of the
longest geodesic path between two vertices [44]. The diameter of the graph G
in Figure 2.1 is not defined as the graph is not connected.
For a set X, we denote the cardinality of X by |X|.
The degree distribution of a graph, P (k), describes the fraction of vertices
in the graph of degree k for k = 0, 1, 2.. [4].
P (k) = |v : {degv(G) = k}||V |
where |V | is the number of vertices in the graph.
A connected component of an undirected graph is a subgraph in which any
two vertices in the subgraph are connected to each other by a path [37].
Vertices (1, 6) form a connected component in G. The giant component
of a graph is the connected component with the greatest number of ver-
tices [40] in the graph. The giant component in G consists of the vertices
(2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14).
A connected triple of vertices refers to a vertex with edges to an unordered
pair of vertices.
A triangle refers to three vertices a, b, c such that the edges ab, bc and ac
exist.
We loosely define hubs to be vertices with high degree [37].
The distance d(u, v) between u, v in V (G) is the length of a shortest path
between u and v. For a set S ⊆ V (G) and u ∈ V (G), we define d(u, S) =
min{d(u, v) : v ∈ S}.
7
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2.2 Graph Properties
It is not evident which properties of a graph are the most important. We
choose which properties to examine based on the problem or application at
hand. Properties that have attracted the most attention recently are explained
below. In this section we describe some features that have been used to qual-
itatively describe a variety of social, biological, and technological networks.
2.2.1 Clustering
Clustering, or transitivity is a property most commonly associated with social
networks. The analogy here is that there is a high probability that a friend of
your friend is also your friend. This implies that there are a high number of
triangles in the graph relative to the number in an Erdos Renyi random graph
(defined later) with the same number of vertices and edges. The clustering
coefficient of the graph is given by
C = 3× N4
N3
where N4 is the number of triangles in the graph, and N3 is the number of
connected triples of vertices. The factor three accounts for the fact that each
triangle is involved in three connected triples, one centred on each vertex.
Graph G1 in the figure below has clustering coefficient C = 3 × 28 = 34 . An
Figure 2.2: Graph G1
alternative and also widely used expression for clustering is the local clustering
coefficient Ci of vertex i [52]. This quantifies how close the neighbours of i
are to being a complete graph (a clique). If ki is the degree of vertex i, li the
number of edges between neighbours of i, then:
Ci = (
N4 connected to vertex i
N3 centred on vertex i
) = 2li
ki(ki − 1)
8
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Using this an alternative definition of the network clustering coefficient is
C˜ = 1
N
∑
i
Ci
This may result in different values for C and C˜ since vertices of higher degree
could be involved in a larger number of triangles than vertices of smaller
degree.
2.2.2 Assortativity
Assortative mixing occurs when vertices of the same type in the network tend
to be connected. Disassortative mixing occurs when vertices of different type
tend to be connected. A typical example of this in social networks is mixing by
race [44], and more generally we tend to associate with people who are similar
to us in some way. In a graph theoretic context, a particularly important
example of assortative mixing is degree correlation, the tendency of vertices
of high degree to associate with other vertices of high degree, or vertices of
low degree to associate with other vertices of low degree. This occurs mainly
in social networks, whereas disassortative mixing is characteristic of biological
and technical networks, for example the internet [43].
One of the most appealing ways of measuring assortativity is to calculate
Pearson’s correlation coefficient r [43] between vertices at the end of each
edge, and average over the edges.
r =
1
N
∑
i jiki − [ 1N
∑
i
1
2(ji + ki)]
2
1
N
∑
i
1
2(j2i + k2i )− [ 1N
∑
i
1
2(ji + ki)]2
where ji, ki are the degrees of the vertices at the ends of the ith edge with
i = 1, .., N . It is generally positive for assortative mixing, negative for disas-
sortative mixing, and zero if there is no correlation between vertex degrees.
2.2.3 Community Structure
Communities are particularly relevant to social networks, and may be defined
loosely in various ways. A community is a subgraph of a graph whose vertices
are tightly connected [11], ie there is a higher density of edges within com-
munities than between them. The ability to identify communities provides
insight into how the network function and topology affect each other. The
strongest definition of a community requires that all pairs of individuals in
9
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the community are connected. In an undirected graph a clique is a subset of
the graph’s vertices such that every pair of vertices is connected by an edge.
There are numerous algorithms for finding communities in graphs [47], [53],
[25], many relying on predetermining the number of communities.
The Girvan-Newman algorithm [28] is an example of an algorithm used for
finding communities in graphs. They define the edge betweenness of a given
edge as the number of shortest paths between pairs of vertices that run through
the edge. Communities are constructed here by removing edges with highest
betweenness from the graph to reveal the community structure. These edges
will generally lie between communities. By examining the graph at different
stages in the algorithm, the communities can be identified. The algorithm is
as follows:
1. Calculate the betweenness for all edges in the network.
2. Remove the edge with the highest betweenness.
3. Recalculate the betweenness for all edges affected by the removal.
4. Repeat from step 2 until no edges remain.
The betweenness centrality must be recalculated at each step, which involves
a lot of computation. This algorithm works well but is too slow to use on very
large networks.
2.2.4 Temporal Evolution Laws
Many real world graphs are dynamically evolving over time, such as the world
wide web, the internet and social networks. If vertices are added to a graph
over time then new properties of the graph may emerge. Two key temporal
evolution laws are the densification power law and the fact that the diameter
of real world graphs is generally found to decrease over time.
The number of edges E(t) and vertices N(t) of many real world graphs obey
the densification power law,
E(t) ∝ N(t)a
10
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a is typically between one and two. Thus real graphs become denser as they
grow. This is in contrast to some graph models such as the preferential at-
tachment model, where the average degree remains constant over time [9].
Let g(d) denote the fraction of connected vertex pairs whose shortest con-
necting path has length at most d. The effective diameter of the network is
defined to be the value of d at which g(d) achieves the value 0.9. The effective
diameter of many real world networks has been observed to shrink or stabilize
as the graph grows with time [36].
2.2.5 Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality is a measure of a vertex’s importance in a graph, and
gives insight into the graph’s structure. It is a more useful measure of the
load placed on a vertex and the vertex’s importance than the vertex’s degree.
The latter is only a local effect while the former is more global to the network.
However betweenness centrality is unfortunately costly to compute.
The betweenness Bj of a vertex j is obtained by counting the number of
geodesic paths going through it [26].
Bj =
∑
ik
σ(i, j, k)
σ(i, k)
where σ(i, j, k) is the number of shortest paths between i, k passing through
j, and σ(i, k) the total number of shortest paths between i, k. Betweenness
scales with the number of pairs of vertices, so the betweenness of a vertex in
an undirected graph can be normalised by dividing by (N−1)(N−2)2 , where N
is the number of vertices in the component that the vertex is a part of. The
betweenness centrality of vertex 3 in the graph below is 4, while the normalised
betweenness centrality is 4/6.
This measure assumes that all relevant interactions follow a shortest path,
which may not be the case [37]. This can be generalized by taking into ac-
count that shortest paths aren’t the only important paths [8]. Information
for example will spread through many paths, not only the shortest paths. An
alternative notion of betweenness can be developed for such scenarios. In this
case the betweenness of a vertex is the probability of it being visited by a
given search algorithm. The betweenness of a vertex here is different to that
calculated using only shortest paths.
11
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2.2.6 Resilience
Resilience is the increase in the geodesic path length of a graph due to a
random removal of a percentage of the graph’s vertices. Different types of
networks can display very different levels of resilience. Scale free networks
(further discussed later in the chapter) are quite resilient, but if removal is
targeted at high degree vertices they can quickly become disconnected. For
example the increase in distance between vertices in the internet is almost
entirely unaffected by random vertex removal. This is because many vertices
have very low degree. However it is vulnerable to deliberate attack on its
highest-degree vertices [5].
Networks such as the internet and power grids are also susceptible to cascading
failure [44]. If a network is carrying a flow, vertices individually experience a
load, and normally this load doesn’t exceed the capacity of that vertex. If flows
on the network change, or vertices are added or removed, dynamic adjustment
of flows on individual vertices occurs automatically, keeping all vertices loaded
below capacity. Cascading failures occur when a heavily loaded vertex is lost.
The redistribution of flow may cause other vertices to exceed their capacity
causing them also to fail. Hence the number of failed or stressed vertices
increases, propagating throughout the network. The entire network may be
affected. This can happen across power grids, when a small outage can spread
across a large area [31].
12
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2.3 Early Graph Models
The random graph model of Erdos and Renyi [22] is considered the most
basic graph model in complex networks. However, it fails to describe many
important properties of real world networks, so it was necessary to create new
models. The small world model proposed by Watts and Strogatz [52] uses
a simple idea to create graphs with a high clustering coefficient, and with a
small diameter. Barabasi and Albert [9] showed that the degree distribution
of many real systems follows a power law. They proposed a scale free model
to explain this.
2.3.1 The Erdos Renyi Random Graph
The first probabilistic generative model was the Erdos Renyi random graph
model, where each pair of vertices has an identical, independent probability p
of being joined by an edge. k is the degree of a vertex and 〈k〉 is the mean
degree of the vertices in the graph. The study of this basic model has led to
a rich mathematical theory. In many ways it fails to match the properties of
real world graphs [11], but it is still very important.
Pajek
Figure 2.3: An Erdos Renyi Graph.
This model has a small expected geodesic path length, of order ln N , where
N is the number of vertices in the graph. It does not demonstrate local
clustering [11]. The expected clustering coefficient of an Erdos Renyi graph is
C =< k > /N , since there are pk(k− 1)/2 edges between the neighbours of a
13
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vertex with degree k, out of a maximum possible number of k(k − 1)/2 [11].
Hence, ER random graphs have a vanishing C for fixed < k > in the limit of
large system size. As N →∞, < k > diverges if p is fixed, instead p = < k >
N − 1
is used.
The probability of a random vertex having degree k is binomial,
P (k) =
(
N − 1
k
)
(pk)(1− p)N−1−k
For a large number of vertices N and the average degree < k > fixed, the
degree distribution is approximately Poisson rather than a power law distri-
bution.
P (k) ∼= < k >
k e−<k>
k!
There are some hubs in the Erdos Renyi model, but real world graphs have
many more.
2.3.2 The Watts and Strogatz Small-World Model
Many real world networks display the small world property, there is a short
path from any vertex to any other vertex in the graph. For example, in social
networks where an edge represents friendship, there is a short path length
from any person to any other person in the world, giving rise to the idea
of ’six degrees of separation’ [38]. Many different kinds of networks display
small world properties, including road maps, electric power grids, metabolite
processing networks, networks of brain neurons, and social networks [52]. In
numerous real world networks there is also a higher level of clustering than
would be found in a random graph. The Watts and Strogatz model tries to
account for the small world property and clustering in as simple a way as
possible. However the model produces graphs that are homogenous in degree
so it doesn’t have hubs or a scale free degree distribution.
To construct the Watts-Strogatz graph, take a regular ring lattice, a graph
with N vertices each connected to 2κ neighbours, κ on each side, with N 
κ  log(N)  1. Each edge is rewired with probability β. Rewiring is done
by replacing edge (Ni, Nj) with (Ni, Nk), where Ni, Nj, Nk are vertices in the
graph, and k is chosen with uniform probability from all possible values that
avoid loops and multiple edges. This introduces βκN rewired edges. When
β = 0 we have the original lattice, with a lot of short cycles but a large
14
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geodesic path length, and when β → 1 the network becomes a random graph
with a short geodesic path but short cycles. If β is between 0 and 1 both
a short geodesic path and a high number of short cycles are present. In the
figure below, N = 15, κ = 2, β = 0.3.
Figure 2.4: A Watts Strogatz Graph.
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2.3.3 Scale Free Networks of Barabasi and Albert
There are many examples of real world networks where the structural changes
are ruled by the dynamical evolution of the system, such as in a social network
when new individuals join over time. Graph models were developed which
attempted to reproduce the growth processes taking place in real networks.
The Barabasi Albert model of network growth was one of the first which
allowed the generated network to grow through the addition of vertices and
edges at each time step. Many of their results are heuristic but have been
made rigorous by Bollobas and Riordan [12]. The degree distribution of the
network is scale free, mirroring many real world networks, such as the world
wide web, citation networks and networks of Hollywood actors. The degree
distribution P (k), where k is the degree of a vertex, follows a power law
P (k) ∼ k−γ
Thus the model accounts for the formation of hubs in a network.
Pajek
Figure 2.5: A Barabasi Albert Graph.
The graph in this model is generated using preferential attachment rules. This
means that vertices of higher degree are more likely to receive new edges than
vertices of lower degree. Unfortunately though, the preferential attachment
model doesn’t allow links to be added between old vertices.
16
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To construct this network start with m0 vertices, each with degree of at least
one, and for each new vertex add m ≤ m0 edges. The probability of a vertex
i receiving an edge from new vertex j is proportional to the degree of i.
P (j → i) = ki∑
x kx
This network model has an interesting property, it isn’t very vulnerable (in
the sense that the geodesic path length doesn’t increase much) to a random
removal of a percentage of its vertices, but if the removal of vertices is targeted
at the vertices of highest degree the network can become disconnected easily
[5].
This model fails to account for the fact that in many real world networks
some vertices that have been added at a late stage can become hubs with very
high degree. The original preferential attachment model rules this possibility
out. To remedy this problem, a parameter called fitness was introduced in
[10], where vertices with a higher level of fitness are more likely to become
hubs. Each new vertex i is given a fitness ηi, where ηi is chosen from some
distribution ρ(η). The probability Π of a vertex i receiving an edge from a
new vertex j depends on the degree ki and on the fitness ηi of i.
Π(j → i) = ηiki∑
x kxηx
This allows late arriving vertices with high levels of fitness to become hubs.
2.4 Hierarchical structure
Many different kinds of networks exhibit hierarchical structure [48], [16], [30],
in which vertices divide into groups and into groups of groups and so on. The
existence of hierarchy can explain and be used to reproduce many important
properties of networks, such as right-skewed degree distributions, high cluster-
ing coefficients and short geodesic path lengths. A knowledge of hierarchical
structure can be used to predict missing links in partly known networks. It is
useful to be able to do this as our knowledge of many networks is substantially
incomplete and being able to predict links can greatly reduce the amount of
data that must be collected before analysis can be done [21], [49].
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Conventionally, hierarchical structure is represented by a tree, or dendrogram,
in which closely related pairs of vertices have lowest common ancestors that
are lower in the tree than those of more distantly related pairs. The probability
of a connection between two vertices depends on their degree of relatedness
[15]. Each internal vertex r of the dendrogram is given a probability pr and
each pair of vertices for which r is the lowest common ancestor is connected
with probability pr.
The lowest common ancestor of two vertices is defined as the lowest vertex
in the hierarchical random graph that has both the vertices as descendants.
The lowest common ancestor of vertices five and six in the graph below is
vertex one. Communities at different levels of organization are disjoint. If
Figure 2.6: A Hierarchical Random Graph.
pr decreases as we move further up the tree then the network generated will
demonstrate assortative mixing, and vice versa. If pr varies randomly through-
out the tree then the network can capture both assortative and disassortative
structure.
The trees created using real data can be used to generate new networks with
the same hierarchical structure. These resampled networks have similar degree
distributions, clustering coefficients, and distributions of shortest path lengths
between pairs of vertices, despite the fact that none of these properties is
explicitly represented in the hierarchical random graph. This set of new trees
18
2.4. Hierarchical structure
can be used to create a consensus tree, which captures the topological features
that appear consistently across all or a large fraction of the trees and typically
is a better summary of the networks structure than any individual tree.
If this method for analyzing graphs is compared to other models for predicting
missing links then it does better than most models for all networks other than
assortative networks. For instance an algorithm based upon the shortest path
will work better for assortative networks. For a predator prey network a
shortest path algorithm predicts connections between predators that don’t
exist in reality. The hierarchical method thus makes accurate predictions for
a wider range of network structures than previous methods, as it is capable of
expressing both assortative and disassortative structure in the same model.
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CHAPTER 3
Online Social Network Models
3.1 Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have existed since the internet was first cre-
ated, for example a graph formed by people emailing each other forms an
OSN. In recent times however, OSNs are used by many more people than ever
before. The emergence of websites such as Flickr, Facebook, Youtube and
Twitter etc have made it easier to study and analyze these networks, such as
the work done in [29], [3], [39], in which the authors examined OSNs such as
Facebook, Cyworld, Orkut, Youtube and Livejournal, and their properties, on
a large scale. Various features that these networks have in common have been
discovered, some of which are common to many different types of networks
and some of which are unique to social networks. It has become possible to
create models of these networks which reflect some of the observed properties,
for example in [17], [32], [46].
It is useful to be able to model networks as we can discover which initial
assumptions give rise to specific network properties and we can predict future
network growth. It allows us to predict the flow of information and other
resources through networks, and enables simulation on networks of arbitrary
size. Many models have been proposed in recent years to create representations
of OSNs that reflect specific properties of real OSNs. A model is chosen in
a given case based upon which properties it is important to replicate. For
instance, if one wishes to study local properties of networks then one would
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choose a model which is particularly good at replicating local properties of
real world networks.
Here we examine various proposed models, each of which goes about construct-
ing a graph model for an OSN in a different way. We look at a community
based graph model, a model created using Kronecker multiplication, and then
graphs models that were recently suggested in a paper by Leskovic et al [35].
Finally we consider the Iterated Local Transitivity graph model of Bonato et
al, which we will use in later chapters.
3.2 A Community based Model
3.2.1 Introduction
Social networks are divided up into communities or groups in the real world,
based on distinctions such as locality, class, race, age etc. This is the basis
of the model proposed in [45]. It captures the properties of clustering and
positive assortative mixing well. Positive assortative mixing is a feature of
social networks but is uncommon in other kinds of networks [43].
3.2.2 Method
The model is as follows:
• there are N individuals and M groups
• an individual can belong to more than one group
• if two individuals are in one group then there is a probability p that
there is an edge between them
• rm is the probability that an individual belongs to m groups
• sn is the probability that a group contains n individuals
In the figure below there are two groups, A,B, and seven individuals. The left
hand figure is a bipartite graph where an edge between an individual and a
group represents membership. The actual graph generated using p with edges
drawn in is shown on the right hand side.
Intuitively, individuals that are members of bigger groups have higher degree
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than individuals that are members of smaller groups, and are likely to be
linked to other individuals of high degree. This results in assortative mixing.
3.3 Kronecker Multiplication Model [34]
3.3.1 Introduction
The Kronecker product is a concept of matrix analysis [51]. It is an operation
on two matrices of any size and results in a block matrix. The Kronecker
product of an m by n matrix A and a p by q matrix B is
A⊗B =

a11B .. a1nB
.. .. ..
am1B .. amnB

For example
 a b
c d
⊗
 e f
g h
 =

ae af be bf
ag ah bg bh
ce cf de df
cg ch dg dh

The Kronecker product G⊗H of the adjacency matrices of two graphs G and
H is a matrix such that edge (xij, xkl) ∈ V (G ⊗ H) if and only if (xi, xk) ∈
V (G) and (xj, xl) ∈ V (H) where xij and xkl are vertices in V (G ⊗ H), and
xi, xj, xk, xl are the corresponding vertices in V (G) and V (H).
It can be used to generate adjacency matrices for undirected graphs that
possess a number of important properties [34], listed below. Graphs generated
in this way display many of the static graph properties of real world social
networks, and some of the temporal evolution laws. In particular they:
• have heavy tails for the degree distribution
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• have heavy tails for the eigenvalues and eigenvectors
• have small diameters
• obey the densification power law
No other graph generator had succeeded in simultaneously capturing all these
properties. This graph generator also leads to tractable analysis and rigorous
proofs.
3.3.2 Method
We start with an initiator graph G1, where N1 is the initial number of vertices
in the graph and E1 is the initial number of edges. Self similar graphs are
generated recursively, using multiple iterations of the Kronecker product. In
all the graphs analysed here it is assumed that there exists a self loop on every
vertex. This ensures that if G1 is a connected graph then Gt is connected for
all t.
The kth Kronecker power of G1 is defined as
G
[k]
1 = Gk = G1 ⊗G1..⊗G1 = Gk−1 ⊗G1
Thus a graph Gk has Nk = Nk1 vertices, and Ek = Ek1 edges. For example in
the graph above, G2 = G1 ⊗G1, E1 = 7, N1 = 3, E2 = 49 and N2 = 9
The adjacency matrices of the above graphs are provided below.
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3.3.3 Properties of Kronecker Graphs
Kronecker graphs have multinomial degree distributions
Suppose a graph G1 has the degree sequence d1, d2..dN1 . Taking G1 ⊗ G1 a
vertex of degree d is expanded into N1 vertices of degrees d× d1, ..d× dN1 . So
the degree of a vertex in the graph Gk is of the form di1 × di2 × ...dik , where
i1, ..ik ∈ (1, ..N1). There is one vertex of each ordered combination, giving
a multinomial distribution on the degrees of Gk. Consider a graph L. The
degree distribution of L⊗ L⊗ L = L3 is given below.
The Kronecker graph Gk has a multinomial distribution for its eigen-
values, and the components of each eigenvector of the Kronecker
graph Gk follow a multinomial distribution.
If G1 has eigenvalues λ1, λ2, ..λN1 , by the properties of Kronecker multipli-
cation [51] the eigenvalues of Gk are the kth Kronecker power of the vector
(λ1, λ2, ..λN1). The eigenvalue distribution is a multinomial. Similarly the com-
ponents of each eigenvector of the Kronecker graph Gk follow a multinomial
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distribution.
Kronecker graphs follow the Densification Power Law (DPL) with
densification exponent a = log(E1)/log(N1).
Gk has Nk = Nk1 vertices and Ek = Ek1 edges, so Ek = Nak where a =
log(E1)/log(N1). a is independent of k.
If G1 has diameter d and a self-loop on every vertex, then for every
k, the graph Gk also has diameter d, so the diameter is constant.
The q-effective diameter de is defined as the minimum de such that, for at
least some fraction or quantile q of the pairs of vertices in the graph that are
part of the same component, the path length is at most de. It is a more robust
quantity than the diameter.
If G1 has diameter d and a self-loop on every vertex, then for every
q, the q-effective diameter of Gk converges to d (from below) as k
increases.
3.3.4 Stochastic Kronecker Graphs
The nature of Kronecker powering produces staircase effects in the degrees
and spectral quantities, as can be seen in the degree distribution of the graph
L3 above, because individual values appear multiple times. Introducing a
stochastic element produces smoother degree and eigenvalue distributions,
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which better reflect real world graphs. This can be done as follows. P1 is
an N1 ×N1 matrix such that pij is the probability that edge (i, j) is present.
The kth Kronecker power P [k]1 = Pk is computed, and then for each entry puv
of Pk an edge between vertices u and v is included with probability pu,v.
Two parameters α, β are used. P1 is created by replacing 0, 1 in the adjacency
matrix of G1 with β and α, (β ≤ α) respectively. The resulting probability
matrices maintain with some random noise the self-similar structure of the
Kronecker graphs. The degree distribution of a stochastic version of L3, with
α = 0.9, β = 0.1 is given below. It is evidentally a lot smoother than the
previous degree distribution.
For small values of α and β, stochastic Kronecker graphs have many small
disconnected components; for large values they have a giant component with
small diameter. In between, they exhibit behavior suggestive of a phase tran-
sition. For a carefully chosen set of (α, β), the diameter is large, and a giant
component just starts emerging [34].
3.4 Graph Evolution Models of Leskovec et
al
A further class of models, introduced in [36], are motivated by a desire to
find some local model of behaviour which naturally leads to the macroscopic
densification power laws and shrinking effective diameter. The graphs here
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are directed, in contrast to the Kronecker graph model. The densification
power law is obeyed in the Community Guided Attachment (CGA) models,
while the Forest Fire model also exhibits shrinking diameter and heavy tailed
in and out degree distributions.
3.4.1 Community Guided Attachment (CGA) model
It is desirable to create a model in which the densification exponent arises indi-
rectly from the construction of the graph model, rather than directly defining
the exponent. This allows insight to be gained into the origin of the densifi-
cation exponent.
Power laws often appear in combination with self-similar datasets [1], so this
model’s approach involves two steps based on self similarity. The first step
is that close (in terms of distance, relation or type etc) vertices are more
likely to be linked than vertices that are not close. The second is that there
is a numerical measure of the difficulty in forming links across communities,
quantified by the difficulty constant c which is explained below.
A tree Γ of height H is constructed of constant fanout b. The fanout b is the
number of branches that each of the tree leaves produce at each step. A tree
leaf is a vertex of degree one. The root vertex is the vertex with no incoming
links, and the height is the length of the longest downward path to a leaf from
the root vertex. The value of the fanout of the tree below is two and the
height H is three. The vertices V in the graph G are the leaves of the tree,
where
n = |V | = bH
and are green in the Figure 3.1. Let h(v, w) define the standard tree distance
between two leaves v, w. This is the height of their closest common ancestor.
The function f(h) gives the probability of there being an edge between v and
w, where h is the height of their closest common ancestor. It is desirable for
f to be scale free, ie f(h)/f(h−1) is constant, so define f(h) = f(0)c−h. f(0)
is set to one, yielding
f(h) = c−h
where c ≥ 1. So as c increases, cross community links become harder to
form. This model obeys the densification power law, and has exponent a =
2− logb(c), when c < b.
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Figure 3.1:
3.4.2 Dynamic Community Guided Attachment model
It is advantageous to create models which are time evolving, as they generally
capture more properties of real networks than static graph models, since most
real world networks change over time. Let d(v, w) be the geodesic distance
between v and w in Γ, considering Γ as an undirected graph, that is the length
of the path from v up to the least common ancestor of v and w, plus the length
of the path from this least common ancestor down to w. Vertices are added
to the tree one at a time. A new vertex v creates an outlink to vertex w with
probability c−d(v,w)/2. The vertices of the graph model are now not only the
leaves of the tree Γ but also the internal vertices of Γ. In timestep t the tree
grows from height t− 1 to height t, adding b new leaves to each current leaf.
The tree distance between vertices v and w of Γ is defined as the length of a
path between them in Γ. Similarly to the previous model this model obeys
the densification power law and has exponent a = 2 − logb(c), when c < b.
For c < b2 it also yields a heavy tailed degree distribution, unlike the basic
model. This model, unlike the previous one, produces a graph with a heavy
tailed distributions of in-degrees.
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3.4.3 Forest Fire Model
The preceding models do not capture the properties of shrinking effective
diameters and heavy tailed out degree distributions that have been observed
in real graphs. The forest fire model succeeds in doing so, as well as having
heavy tailed in-degrees, a community structure, and obeying the densification
power law. In this model, vertices arrive individually over time.
Given an initial graph G, a new vertex v initially links to a vertex w, cho-
sen uniformly at random from the existing graph, and then begins creating
(burning) new outlinks. Random numbers x, y are generated, which are geo-
metrically distributed with means p/(1− p) and rp/(1− rp) respectively. p is
the forward burning probability, and r the backward burning ratio. v selects
x outlinks and y inlinks of w. w1, w2...wx+y denotes the other ends of the se-
lected links. v forms outlinks to w1, w2...wx+y, and then applies the previous
step recursively to each of w1, w2...wx+y. Vertices cannot be visited twice.
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The graph G above was created using the forest fire model, with parameters
p = r = 0.25. An important feature of this model is that some vertices burn a
large number of edges and so form a large number of outlinks. Dense or sparse
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matrices can be generated depending on the forward and backward burning
parameters. In the subgraph below of graph G, vertex 61 initially links to
vertex 29. It links to vertices 47 and 31 at the next step and to 56 at the final
step.
3.5 Iterated Local Transitivity (ILT) model
3.5.1 Introduction
We now examine the OSN model which we shall study in detail in later chap-
ters. A model [13] that we use to generate graphs is examined below. Bonato
et al developed a deterministic model for online social networks based on tran-
sitivity and local knowledge in social interactions. The ILT provably satisfies
a number of both global and local properties, namely:
• the densification power law
• decreasing average distance
• higher clustering than in random graphs with same average degree
• constant diameter
Given an initial graph as a starting point, vertices are repeatedly added over
time which clone each existing vertex, so that the new vertices form an in-
dependent set. (An independent set is a set of vertices in a graph, no two
of which are connected.) At each time step, and for every vertex v, a new
vertex appears, and an edge is added between it and every neighbour of v.
The model incorporates local knowledge only in its growth, since each vertex
joins only to neighbours of an existing vertex.
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3.5.2 Method
The ILT model generates simple, finite, undirected graphs (Gt : t ≥ 0). The
only parameter is the fixed, finite, connected graph G0. To form Gt+1, for each
vertex v ∈ V (Gt) add a clone v′, which is joined to v and all the neighbours
of v at time t. The set of new vertices at time t+ 1 form an independent set
of cardinality |V (Gt)|. Let degt(v) be the degree of a vertex at time t, the
number of vertices of Gt be nt, and the number of edges be et. Then nt = 2tn0,
and
degt+1(v) = 2degt(v) + 1
degt+1(v′) = degt(v) + 1
The graph below shows the evolution of a graph G0. Vertices a1, a2, a3, a4 ∈
V (G0) and a′1, a′2, a′3, a′4 ∈ V (G1)\V (G0). a′1 is the clone of a1 and so on.
3.5.3 Main Results
The key properties of the ILT model were considered in [13]. We recall some
of the most relevant of these here. The ILT model displays properties such
as higher clustering than in random graphs with the same average degree,
and smaller spectral gaps for both their normalized Laplacian and adjacency
matrices than in random graphs. The volume of Gt is defined as
vol(Gt) =
∑
x∈V (Gt)
degt(x) = 2et
Theorem 3.5.1. For t > 0 the average degree of Gt is
et
nt
=
(3
2
)t (vol(G0)
n0
+ 2
)
− 2
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This shows that the ILT model obeys the densification power law et ∝ nat , with
exponent a = log3
log2 . This is a reasonable figure for the exponent in comparison
with real world graphs [36].
The Wiener index W (Gt) of Gt is defined as follows:
W (Gt) =
1
2
∑
x,y∈V (Gt)
d(x, y)
The average distance of Gt is:
L(Gt) =
W (Gt)(
nt
2
)
The ultimate average distance of G0 is:
UL(G0) = lim
t→∞L(Gt)
assuming the limit exists. This is a new graph parameter, introduced in [13].
The following lemma is important when considering the diameter of a graph
and the distance between vertices as the graph evolves. The distance in Gt+1
between some v ∈ Gt and w′ ∈ Gt+1, a clone of some w ∈ Gt, is the same
as the distance between v and w in Gt. The distance between v and w is
unchanged.
Lemma 3.5.1. Let x, y be vertices in Gt with t > 0. Then
dt+1(x′, y) = dt+1(x, y′) = dt+1(x, y) = dt(x, y)
and
dt+1(x′, y′) =
 dt(x, y) if xy /∈ E(Gt)dt(x, y) + 1 = 2 if xy ∈ E(Gt)
Theorem 3.5.2. (Average Distance)
For t > 0,
W (Gt) = 4t(W (G0) + (e0 + n0)(1− (3/4)t))
For t > 0,
L(Gt) =
4t(W (G0) + (e0 + n0)(1− (3/4)t))
4tn20 − 2tn0
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For all graphs G0,
UL(G0) =
W (G0) + e0 + n0
n20
Further UL(G0) ≤ L(G0) iff W (G0) ≥ (n0 − 1)(e0 + n0).
The average distance of Gt is bounded above by diam(G0)− 1, and the con-
dition above for UL(G0) ≤ L(G0) holds for large cycles and paths, thus for
many initial graphs G0 the average distance decreases at each step, a property
which has been observed in OSNs and other complex networks.
If C˜(Gt) = 1N
∑
iCi is the network clustering coefficient of graph Gt, then the
following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.5.3.
C˜(Gt) = O
((7
8
)t
t2
)
C˜(Gt) tends to zero much faster in a random graph than for the ILT model.
This is important since in many real world networks and in particular in
social networks, vertices tend to create tightly knit groups characterised by a
relatively high density of ties.
The normalized Laplacian of a graph [10], relates to important graph proper-
ties. Let A denote the adjacency matrix of a graph G such that no vertices in
the graph are isolated, and let D denote the diagonal adjacency matrix of G.
Then the normalized Laplacian of G is
L = I −D−1/2AD−1/2
Let
0 = λ0 ≤ λ1... ≤ λn−1 ≤ 2
denote the eigenvalues of L. The spectral gap of the normalized Laplacian is
λ = max{|λ1 − 1|, |λn−1 − 1|}
Theorem 3.5.4. For t ≥ 1, λ(Gt) > 12
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This contrasts markedly with the expansion properties of random graphs and
the preferential attachment model. Social networks organize into communities,
and as a result, their adjacency matrices possess bad expansion properties
realized by small gaps between their first and second eigenvalues [17].
The spectral properties of the adjacency matrices of the ILT model are charac-
terised in the following result. Let ρ0(t) ≥ |ρ1(t)| ≥ .. denote the eigenvalues
of the adjacency matrix of Gt.
Theorem 3.5.5. The eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of Gt+1 are:
ρ±
√
(ρ2 + 4(ρ+ 1)2)
2
for every ρ which is an eigenvalue of Gt.
3.5.4 Stochastic Version of the ILT model
When new individuals join a real world social network, they may already be
friends. This point is taken into account in the stochastic version of the ILT
model, ILT(p). New vertices added to the graph Gt are linked to each other
with independent probability p(k), where k is the number of vertices added at
time t+1. This model retains many properties of the original ILT model. The
average distance may only decrease, and the clustering coefficient may only
increase. ILT(p) generates graphs following a densification power law with
exponent log(3 + δ)/log 2 where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, depending on the value of p.
3.5.5 Domination number
An interesting property of the ILT model is that the domination number of
the graphs Gt for t > 0 remain the same as for the graph G0. A dominating
set for a graph G = (V,E) is a subset D of V : every vertex not in D is
joined to at least one member of D by some edge. The domination number is
the number of vertices in a smallest dominating set. In the graph below an
example of a dominating set is the set of the red vertices.
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CHAPTER 4
Games on Networks
4.1 Introduction
The study of games is important in economics, computer science, the social
sciences, and in studying both human and animal behaviour. It is used in
economics and business to model interacting agents. This can be of particular
interest in areas such as viral marketing and advertising, which are related
to areas such as epidemic spreading [27], [20]. The recent large increase in
interest in the study of social networks makes the study of games on these
networks of more importance than ever. Much of human behaviour can be
viewed as a game in which a person’s utility is determined by the behaviour
of those who are in some sense close to them, such as friends, associates, or
trading partners [2], [14].
We examine various models for games on networks below. In each game there
is a set of players (or agents) who are trying to maximize their individual
utilities (or payoffs). The utility of a player is defined in a different way for
each game. For some games there is a small set of players who choose a starting
vertex on a graph in such a way as to maximize the number of other vertices
which they capture, which is in this case their utility. In other games every
vertex in the graph is a player that has to choose between two options, to
adopt or not to adopt an idea (or innovation/rumour). The utility of a player
here is calculated based on the decisions the player and each of its neighbours
makes.
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A player’s strategy refers to the decision that a player makes in a game,
for example for some games it is which vertex to initially select. The best
response of a player is the decision the player can make which maximizes its
utility, given the other players’ decisions. A strategy combination is a set of
strategies for each player which fully specifies the decisions each player will
make given the other players’ decisions. It gives the best response of each
player to the other players’ decisions. We will refer to a strategy profile here
as the set of decisions which the players have made at a given point in the
game.
A central theme in the study of games is the existence of Nash equilibria.
A pure Nash Equilibrium occurs if no player can increase its utility by uni-
laterally changing its decision. From here on pure Nash Equilibria will be
referred to as Nash Equilibria. There may be multiple Nash equilibria for a
single game, and some games may have no Nash equilibria. A Nash equilib-
rium does not necessarily mean maximising the sum of the utilities for all the
players involved; in many cases, all the players might improve their utilities if
they were allowed to cooperate.
We will use the stag hunt game to illustrate the above concepts. This is a
coordination game with two Nash Equilibria. There are two players in the
game, and each player has two choices, hunt a stag or hunt a hare. In order
to receive a payoff for hunting a stag a player must have the other player’s
cooperation, but the payoff if both players hunt a stag is substantially greater
than for a hare. The two Nash Equilibria occur when both players choose to
hunt a stag or both players choose to hunt a hare. The utility matrix for this
situation is given below. Thus for player one, the strategy combination is as
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follows. If player two plays hare then player one will play hare, and if player
two plays stag, player one will do likewise.
4.2 Diffusion and cascading behaviour in
random networks
4.2.1 Introduction
Our work is motivated by the problem of information diffusion on social
networks. We now discuss a number of game theoretic models of this phe-
nomenon. A simple model of diffusion on networks is presented by Lelarge
[33]. All the models in this section are from this paper. The results here are
restricted to deterministic infinite graphs. In this case every vertex in the
graph is a player. The player’s behaviour here is a result of strategic choice.
The players play a co-ordination game with binary choice. The players de-
cide which state to be in based upon their neighbours’ decisions. For example
the different states could represent subscription to differing mobile phone net-
works, in which there are benefits for users subscribing to the same network.
This model has many applications, particularly in word of mouth advertising.
4.2.2 The model
Each vertex chooses to either be in state A or state B. If there is an edge
between vertices i, j then:
• if i and j are in state A then both vertices receive a payoff of q
• if i and j are in state B then both vertices receive a payoff of 1− q
• if i and j are in different states then they both receive no payoff
The total payoff that each vertex receives is the sum of the payoffs it receives
from each neighbour. Let NAi , NBi be the total number of neighbours of i
that choose A and B respectively, and di be the degree of i.
• The total payoff that i receives if i is in state A is q(di −NBi )
• The total payoff that i receives if i is in state B is (1− q)NBi
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So if NBi > qdi the payoff for choosing state B is higher, thus vertex i will
choose state B, otherwise it will choose state A. Lelarge examines the case of
diffusion in the large population limit when the underlying graph is a random
networkG(n, d) with n vertices and where d is a given degree sequence. Clearly
the cases where all vertices play either A or B are equilibria of the network.
4.2.3 Permanent adoption model
In this model [33] all vertices start in state A, and then a small number are
forced to adopt state B. Vertices that adopt state B at the start are forced
to play it forever. All vertices other than this initial seed now apply a best
response update. This is called the permanent adoption model. It is useful in
describing a situation in which an idea/product/opinion is spread through a
network starting from an initially small group of people.
For a graph G = (V,E) and a parameter q, the largest connected component of
the subgraph in which all vertices have degree less than q−1 is considered. The
vertices in this component are called pivotal players: if only one pivotal player
switches from A to B then the whole set of pivotal players will eventually
switch to B in the permanent adoption model. For a player v ∈ V , we denote
by C(v, q) the final number of players playing B in the permanent adoption
model with parameter q, when the initial state consists of only v playing B, all
other players playing A. Informally, C(v, q) is the size of the cascade induced
when only player v starts in state B initially.
If B can spread to the whole population from a finite set of initial adopters
then a contagion is said to occur. There is a contagion threshold such that
contagion occurs if and only if q is less than the contagion threshold [42]. This
threshold is always at most 1/2. The lower q is the easier the diffusion spreads.
If q is sufficiently low, there are two thresholds for the average degree λ,
1 < λi(q) < λs(q) such that a global cascade for a fixed q is only possible for
λ ∈ (λi(q);λs(q)). For example for Erdos Renyi graphs
• If λ is close to 1 the diffusion doesn’t branch much and progresses along
paths, until it is stopped by a high degree vertex.
• If λ > λs(q) there are too many high degree vertices, which stop the
diffusion process. These vertices are locally stable, in that they have
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many neighbours, so a high proportion of these neighbours need to have
adopted B in order for them to adopt it.
Connectivity plays an ambiguous role, it allows for spread of A and B but
diffusion is limited by high degree vertices which are very stable.
This also explains why social networks can display a great stability in the
presence of continual small shocks that are as large as the shocks that ulti-
mately generate a global cascade. Cascades are an example of the robust yet
fragile nature of many complex systems
4.2.4 Nonmonotonic Model
Another possible model [33], the nonmonotonic model, is one in which the
initial vertices that are forced to play B also apply the best response update
after time t = 0. In this model, if the dynamic converges, the final state will
be an equilibrium of the game. An equilibrium of the game is a fixed point
of the best response dynamics. For example, the states in which all players
play A or all players play B are trivial equilibria of the game. In contrast the
permanent adoption model does not necessarily lead to an equilibrium of the
game as the initial vertices forced to play B don’t apply the best response
update.
The yellow player in the graph below, where the rectangles represent a long
line of players, induces a global cascade in the permanent adoption model but
not in the nonmonotonic model, for q = 1/3. In the nonmonotonic model
the graph will oscillate from the state where only the yellow player plays B
and the state where only the yellow players’ neighbours play B. If a player
induces a global cascade for the nonmonotonic model, it will also induce a
global cascade in the permanent adoption model, but as illustrated by the
example, the converse is not true in general.
Thus a pivotal player doesn’t necessarily induce a global cascade in the non-
monotonic model. If there exists a finite set of initial adopters causing a
complete cascade for the permanent adoption model, it is also possible to find
another set of initial adopters leading to a complete cascade for the nonmono-
tonic model [42]. Hence the contagion threshold is the same for both models.
If two pivotal players that are neighbours are switched from A to B then the
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whole set of pivotal players will eventually switch to B in the nonmonotonic
model. So the contagion threshold is the same in both models, and both
models will have exactly the same dynamics if started with the set of pivotal
players playing B and all other players playing A.
4.3 Voronoi Games
The Voronoi game is quite similar to the competitive game of Alon et al [7]
which is a major focus of our later discussion. There are κ players, each of
which selects a vertex on the graph. A strategy profile is the set of vertices
selected by each player. The Voronoi game is represented as the pair 〈G, κ〉,
where [1, κ] = {1, .., κ} is the set of players, and κ ≥ 2. The utility of a player
i in this case measures the size of its Voronoi cell. The Voronoi cell of player
i if strategy profile s is used is the set:
V ori(s) = {v ∈ V (G)|d(si, v) ≤ d(si′ , v) for each player i′ ∈ [κ]}
If a vertex k is at equal distance to j closest players then it is called a boundary
vertex. Each of the closest players receives a payoff of 1
j
from k. Clearly the
total payoff of all the players in the graph remains constant, |V (G)|.
In the graph below, if the strategy profile x = (i, j) is used then U1(x) =
U2(x) = 4.5. The dashed line represents the boundary of the two Voronoi cells,
and k is a boundary vertex. In a Nash Equilibrium no player can unilaterally
increase its utility by changing to another vertex. In Voronoi games two
players are permitted to choose the same initial vertex. The multiplicity of a
vertex v using strategy profile s is:
µv(s) = |{i′ ∈ [κ]|v ∈ V ori′(s)}|
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The utility of player i using strategy profile s is:
Ui(s) =
∑
v∈V ori(s)
1
µv(s)
4.3.1 Nash Equilibria for Voronoi Games
It is difficult to establish whether or not Nash Equilibria exist on a given graph,
as in general every possible strategy profile must be checked to see if any player
can benefit from deviating from it. Even if the locations of the players are
given, enumeration of the Voronoi cells is a combinatorial bottleneck. In light
of this Feldmann et al [24] attempted to find graphs in which the existence
of Nash Equilibria was dependent on the properties of the graph and explicit
calculation of the utilities of each strategy profile was unnecessary.
4.3.2 Relevant definitions
The pair of vertices u, v are said to be antipodal if d(u, v) = diam(G). For
some V ′ ⊆ V (G)
Ω(V ′) = {u ∈ V (G)|d(u, v) is the same for all vertices v ∈ V ′}
Two graphs G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E ′) are isomorphic if there is a bijection
ϕ : V → V ′ such that for each pair of vertices u, v ∈ V, {u, v} ∈ E if and
only if {ϕ(u), ϕ(v)} ∈ E ′; so ϕ preserves both edges and non-edges. The
bijection ϕ is called an isomorphism from G to G′. An automorphism of G is
an isomorphism from G to itself.
The graph G is vertex transitive if for each pair of vertices u, v ∈ V there exists
an automorphism φ of G such that φ(u) = v. The graph G is generously vertex
43
Chapter 4. Games on Networks
transitive if for each pair of vertices u, v ∈ V there exists an automorphism
φ of G such that φ(u) = v and φ(v) = u. Informally if G is generously
vertex transitive each pair of vertices can be swapped. Any complete graph is
generously vertex transitive.
A graph G is friendly if G is generously vertex transitive, and if for any pair
of antipodal vertices α, β ∈ V (G), and for any arbitrary vertex γ ∈ V (G), γ
is on a shortest path between α and β.
4.3.3 Results of Feldmann et al
For the case where the number of players κ = 2 if a graph is generously vertex
transitive then every strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium. If G is vertex
transitive with κ = 2 and there exist vertices α, β such that U1(〈α, β〉) 6=
U2(〈α, β〉) then the Voronoi game has no Nash Equilibrium.
Given a game on a friendly graph G with κ = 4 then for any arbitrary antipo-
dal pair α, β the profile s = (α, α, β, β) is a Nash Equilibrium. If two players
are not allowed to occupy the same vertex then for a bipartite friendly graph
G with κ = 4 the game has a Nash Equilibrium at s = (α, β, δ, γ) where α, β
and γ, δ are two distinct antipodal pairs. For the case of κ = 3 Feldmann et
al were unable to bypass explicit enumeration of the Voronoi cells.
The class of graphs for which Feldmann et al’s results hold is very restric-
tive, and illustrates the considerable difficulty of finding Nash Equilibria and
characterising Nash Equilibria for games on networks.
4.4 Games on Networks [18]
4.4.1 Introduction
Diffusion of innovation can be examined from a game theoretic perspective
on strategic decisions made by individuals in a social context. For example a
mobile phone user’s choice of whether to adopt an unlimited text messaging
plan or to adopt a pay per message plan is influenced by their friends’ decisions.
Choosing a particular strategy in this case becomes more attractive as more
friends choose it. This is an example of a symmetric two player base game on a
social network. The general question of whether or not properties, such as the
existence of pure Nash Equilibria, of the base game carry over to the networked
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game has been examined in [18]. Multiplayer games on social networks directly
correspond to the model used here, and have proven to be models of many
natural scenarios involving strategic interaction.
4.4.2 The model
The game M played between two players is a symmetric co-ordination game,
that is one in which a player only receives a positive payoff if they make the
same selection as the other player. Both players receive identical payoffs. The
players share a strategy set S = {s1, .., sk}. Both players receive payoffs of vi
if both choose si, i ∈ {1, .., k}, and both receive a payoff of zero if they choose
differing strategies. This game is referred to as the k-strategy co-ordination
game with payoffs {v1, .., vk}. The strategies are ordered so that v1 ≤ v2.. ≤ vk.
Every vertex in a graph G is a player. Each player chooses a strategy from
S and simultaneously plays that strategy against each of its neighbours in G.
s = (s1, .., sn) is a strategy profile of the choice each player has made. Player
i receives as its payoff pi(s) the sum of the payoffs from playing the game M
with each neighbour. The resulting game is denotedM⊕G. The set of players
is V , the set of vertices in G. For example if G is a two vertex graph with one
edge M ⊕G is isomorphic to M .
A strategy profile s is a Nash Equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate
from s to improve their payoff. The social welfare of s is ∑ pi(s). The social
optimum OPT is the strategy profile s that maximizes ∑ pi(s). The ’worst’
N.E. WNE is the Nash Equilibrium that minimizes ∑ pi(s). The ’best’ Nash
Equilibrium BNE is the Nash Equilibrium that maximizes ∑ pi(s). The price
of anarchy POA is OPT/WNE. The price of stability POS is OPT/BNE.
ΓG(u) is the set of neighbours of u.
4.4.3 Best Response Dynamics (BRD)
Best Response Dynamics (BRD) is an algorithm that produces a sequence of
strategy profiles by repeatedly allowing a player i to update their strategy to a
strategy in Si which maximizes pi(s), holding all other strategies constant. If
BRD terminates then it terminates at a Nash Equilibrium, however it may not
terminate even if a Nash Equilibrium exists. BRD is said to always converge
if this process terminates regardless of the initial strategy profile s.
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4.4.4 Observations made by Davis et al
There are few positive results regarding the existence of Nash Equilibria and
BRD always converging, essentially nothing can be inferred in either direction
about the existence of Nash equilibria in M and the existence of pure Nash
equilibria in M ⊕ G. The limited exception arises in the case of a bipartite
graph B.
Let B be an arbitrary bipartite graph.
• If a base game M has a Nash Equilibrium, then the game M ⊕B has a
Nash Equilibrium.
• If a base game M has no Nash Equilibria, then there may or may not
exist a Nash Equilibrium on M ⊕B.
• If BRD always converges on M then it may or may not always converge
on M ⊕B.
• If BRD always converges on M ⊕B then it always converges on M .
Let G be an arbitrary non-bipartite graph.
• If a base game M has a Nash Equilibrium, then there may or may not
exist a Nash Equilibrium on M ⊕G.
• If a base game M has no Nash Equilibria, then there may or may not
exist a Nash Equilibrium on M ⊕G.
• If BRD always converges on M then it may or may not always converge
on M ⊕G.
• If BRD always converges on M ⊕ G then it may or may not always
converge on M .
The proof that if a base gameM has a Nash Equilibrium, then the gameM⊕B
has a Nash Equilibrium, described in [18], is given below. It is clear that the
properties of the bipartite graph allow for there to be a direct relationship
between the games on M and on M ⊕G.
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Lemma 4.4.1. For every bipartite graph G and for every base game M that
has a pure Nash equilibrium, the game M ⊕ G has a pure Nash equilibrium
too.
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary base game that has a Nash equilibrium s =
(a, b). Let G = 〈L ∪ R,E〉 be an arbitrary bipartite graph. Consider the
strategy profile p in which p(u) = a for u ∈ L and p(u) = b for u ∈ R. It is
claimed that p is a Nash equilibrium in M ⊕G. Let
pu(a) = u’s payoff for playing a in M when the other player plays according to s
pˆu(a) = u’s payoff for playing a in M⊕G when the other player plays according to p
Then we have pˆu(a) = d(u)pu(a) where d(u) denotes the degree of vertex u
in G. No player wants to deviate from s in M , so no vertex wants to deviate
from p in M ⊕G. Thus p is a Nash equilibrium in M ⊕G.
4.5 Competitive Information Diffusion
4.5.1 Diffusion
A simple model of competitive information diffusion on graphs was introduced
in [7]. This model considers the diffusion process as a competitive game taking
place on a graph that captures the underlying social structure. The model
considers players who wish to spread their idea through the network. It has
applications in areas such as viral marketing. The players are initially assigned
vertices which they “colour” at the first timestep in the diffusion process.
At each following timestep, uncoloured vertices adjacent to vertices that are
already coloured are coloured according to the following rules. If two or more
vertices of different colour neighbour an uncoloured vertex, then in the next
timestep this vertex is coloured grey. This colour grey does not propagate
through the network. If a vertex is neighboured by vertices coloured grey and
one other colour then the uncoloured vertex takes this colour. If an uncoloured
vertex is adjacent to vertices of only one colour, then the uncoloured vertex
takes this colour. All other uncoloured vertices remain uncoloured. This
represents the spread of an idea through a social network. The diffusion
process ends when no further vertices can be coloured. The utility of a player
is the number of vertices that it has coloured at the end of the diffusion process.
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In the graph below the diffusion process is shown. There are two players 1 and
2, that colour the vertices green and blue respectively. The diffusion process
terminates at timestep t = 2.
Figure 4.1: The diffusion process
Alon et al give a sufficient condition for a graph of diameter two to have a
Nash Equilibrium [6]. Let D(G) be the diameter of a graph G.
Theorem 4.5.1. Let G be a graph and let the set of players {1, .., n} such
that D(G′) ≤ 2 for every G′ that is obtained from G by removing n−1 vertices
along with their neighbours. Then the game admits a Nash equilibrium, which
can be found in polynomial time.
They initially claimed that every graph of diameter two would admit a Nash
Equilibrium. If the grey vertices were allowed to propagate then this would
indeed hold, but Takehara et al [50] demonstrated that this was incorrect
given that they do not. Although a graph may have diameter two, this does
not imply that the diffusion process will terminate by time t = 1. Takehara
et al provide the following example. If the strategy profile x = (v1, v9) is used
on the graph below then vertices v6 and v7 are not coloured until time t = 2.
This graph has no Nash Equilibrium for two players.
For any x1 ∈ V (G) and x2 ∈ {v4, .., v9} there exists some v ∈ {v1, v2, v3} such
that U2(x1, x2) < U2(x1, v). So starting on an ’inner’ vertex will always give a
vertex a higher utility than starting on an ’outer’ vertex. It is the case that:
U2(v1, v2) < U2(v1, v3), U2(v2, v3) < U2(v2, v1) and U2(v3, v1) < U2(v3, v2), ie
once both players are starting on one of {v1, v2, v3}, it is always beneficial for
one of the players to change their starting vertex.
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Alon et al also show that a graph of diameter three may not admit a Nash
Equilibrium [7], and note that this result may be extended to graphs of any
diameter greater than three, or for any number of agents greater than two.
4.6 Some Results
4.6.1 Star Graphs and Cliques
Certain classes of graphs are guaranteed to have a Nash Equilibrium for the
diffusion game described above for any number of players. For the remainder
of the chapter let the set of players be {1, .., n} on a graph G, and V (G) =
{v1, .., vN} be the set of vertices in the graph. The game played on these
graphs is described in Alon’s paper [7] and in the previous section.
A star graph is a tree on N vertices such that one vertex has degree N − 1
and all other vertices have degree 1.
Lemma 4.6.1. A star graph S will have a Nash Equilibrium for any number
of players NA.
Proof. Consider a strategy profile x = (x1, .., xn), such that a player 1 starts
on the internal vertex. There exists an edge between player 1 and every other
v ∈ V (S). Thus the diffusion process will terminate at t = 1. The utility of
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Figure 4.2: The star graph S5, with blue leaves and a grey internal vertex
player 1 is U1(x) = N − (n− 1), and cannot be improved, since n− 1 of the
vertices are coloured by other the players. The utility Uj(x) = 1 for j 6= 1
since every player pj, j 6= 1 is on a leaf of the graph, and only has an edge
to player 1. The players pj, j 6= 1 cannot improve their utility since they can
only move to another leaf of the graph. Thus x is a Nash Equilibrium.
Figure 4.3: The clique K4
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Lemma 4.6.2. Any strategy profile on a clique C is a Nash Equilibrium for
any number of players n.
Proof. There exists an edge between every pair of vertices v, w ∈ C. Consider
a strategy profile x. If the number of players is greater than one, then every
vertex that is coloured white at time t = 0 is linked to more than one player,
thus is coloured grey at time t = 1. Therefore the utility of every player is
one, regardless of which vertex is initially chosen. Every strategy profile is a
Nash Equilibrium. If there is only one player, then regardless of which vertex
the player initially starts on this player will colour every vertex on the graph
at time t = 1, so again every strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium.
We later present some results concerning the existence of N.E. on trees. We
first note the following fact.
Example 4.6.1. Let T be a tree. A game played on T may not have a Nash
Equilibrium, as shown below.
Consider a game on the tree below with seven vertices and three players. Let
Figure 4.4: The tree T
us assume without loss of generality that strategy profile x = (vi, vj, vk) where
i < j < k. We will show that this profile cannot maximize the utility of every
player simultaneously, and thus cannot exhibit a Nash Equilibrium.
If vivj /∈ E(T ) then U1(x) is improved by player 1 instead choosing vertex
vj−1.
If vjvk /∈ E(T ) U3(x) is improved similarly to the previous case by player
3 choosing vertex vj+1.
If vivj ∈ E(T ) and vjvk ∈ E(T ) then U2(x) = 1, and it is always possible
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for player 2 to improve their utility by moving to either vi−1 or vk+1
No strategy profile can satisfy the three players simultaneously, so there exists
no Nash Equilibrium on this graph.
4.6.2 Cliques
Lemma 4.6.3. Take a graph G containing a clique C. If more than one
player initially selects vertices in C, then at the end of the diffusion process
each player will have coloured one vertex in C.
Proof. Every v ∈ C that is not initially selected by a player is neighboured
by more than one player, so is coloured grey at t = 1. Thus every player only
colours itself out of all the vertices in the clique.
For the following result, we introduce a graph parameter, CD(G), which is
the minimal number of cliques into which the vertices of G can be partitioned.
Formally, CD(G) is the minimal k such that there exist vertex disjoint cliques
C1, . . . , Ck in G with V (G) = V (C1) ∪ · · ·V (Ck). CD(G) = 2 in the graph G
in Figure 4.5 below, where the vertices in one clique are coloured blue, and in
the other clique yellow.
Figure 4.5: The graph G
Proposition 4.6.1. Let G be a connected graph and consider the diffusion
process D on G. If CD(G) = 2, then there exists a Nash equilibrium for D
on G for any n ≥ 2.
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Proof. Label the two cliques C1 and C2. There exists at least one edge, say vw
between C1 and C2 since the graph is connected. Let player 1 select v ∈ V (C1)
and player 2 select w ∈ V (C2), so x = (v, w), and let the number of edges
between any c ∈ V (C1) and w be γ. Consider the case where there are two
agents.
There are γ − 1 grey vertices in C1 at the end of the diffusion process, since
there are γ edges between C1 and w, and there is an edge between v and w.
Then the utility of player 1 is
U1(x) = |C1| − γ + 1
Suppose player 1 instead selects some element of c ∈ C2, x′ = (c, w) From
Lemma 4.6.3 player 1 can only colour itself in C2. Thus
max U1(x′) = 1 + |C1| − γ
Suppose player 1 instead colours some other element of C1. If there is no edge
between this vertex and w then player 1 colours one fewer vertex, as an extra
vertex in C1 is coloured grey. If there exists an edge between this vertex and
w then it will colour the same vertices as v. Thus it is not beneficial for player
1 to select a vertex other than v. The same reasoning applies to player 2. So
x = (v, w) is a Nash Equilibrium for two players.
Now suppose there are n players on the graph, and the strategy profile is now
xn = (v, w, v1, .., vn−2). By Lemma 4.6.3 any player other than 1 or 2 will have
a utility of one, since every vertex in the graph is either neighboured by player
1 or player 2, so it cannot benefit any of these players to move.
Players 1 cannot benefit by moving to any c ∈ V (C2), as demonstrated above.
By moving to any other vertex in C1 player 1 can at best equal the utility it
has by selecting v. Thus x is a Nash Equilibrium on G.
4.6.3 Trees
Lemma 4.6.4. Let there be a game on a tree T with two players. If player 1
initially selects a vertex v, the vertex w selected by player 2 which maximizes
player 2’s utility is a neighbour of v.
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Proof. Suppose player one selects vertex v, and the degree of v is l. T is a tree,
so every edge is a bridge. Then the deletion of v will divide the graph into
l connected components C1, .., Cl. Let vertex ηi be the neighbour of vertex v
that is an element of Ci.
Player 2 cannot colour vertices in more than one of these components, since
the path between any pair of components must include v. Thus the maximum
number of vertices that player 2 can colour is max |V (Ca)| for a ∈ 1, .., l.
Suppose player 2 initially selects ηy ∈ Cy, a neighbour of v. For any vk ∈ Cy
there exists a path v, ηy, .., vk. This path is unique since T is a tree. So player
1 cannot colour any vk ∈ Cy, thus the utility of player 2 is |Cy|. So if player
2 selects ηy ∈ Cy it will colour all vk ∈ Cy. Thus the maximum number of
vertices player 2 will colour starting from a neighbour of x1 is max |V (Ca)| for
a ∈ {1, .., l}. This is the maximum number of vertices that it is possible for
player 2 to colour, so player 2 cannot improve its payoff by moving to some
vj /∈ Nv.
For example it can be seen that the tree below is split into three components
if x1 is removed, and that selecting a neighbour of x1 gives the highest utility
for player two.
Lemma 4.6.5. Let there be a game on a tree T with two players, and let
x = (v, w) be a strategy profile such that v, w are neighbours. If player 2
moves to some η ∈ Nv\{w}, with x′ = (v, η) then U2(x′) < U1(x)
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Proof. Suppose the two graph components formed when edge {v, w} is re-
moved are Cv, Cw. Player 1 colours all the vertices in Cv, and player 2 colours
all the vertices in Cw.
By Lemma 4.6.4 the vertex which maximizes player 2’s utility is a neighbour
of v. Suppose x′ = (v, η) where η ∈ Cv, η ∈ Nv\{w}. Player 2 in this case
cannot colour any elements of Cw, since the path to any c ∈ Cw must involve
v. Player 2 colours some subset of Cv\v, so
max U2(x′) = |V (Cv)| − 1 < U1(x)
Lemma 4.6.6. Let there be a game on a tree T with two players. If a strategy
profile x is such that x1, x2 are neighbours, there are no grey vertices in the
graph once the diffusion process is completed, and U1(x) + U2(x) = |V (T )|.
Proof. x1, x2 are at distance one, and have no common neighbour, since T is
a tree. If the edge between x1 and x2 is removed, the graph is split into two
connected components, C1 and C2, since every edge is a bridge. There is a
unique path between any two vertices, so player 2 cannot colour any vertex
in C1, as any path to a vertex in C1 must involve x1. Likewise player 1 can
colour no vertices in C2. Player 1 then colours every vertex in C1 and player 2
colours every vertex in C2. Every vertex in the graph is coloured by player 1
or player 2 at the end of the diffusion process, and no vertex is coloured grey.
Thus U1(x) + U2(x) = |V (T )|.
Proposition 4.6.2. Let x = (v, w) be a strategy profile on a tree T such
that v, w are neighbours, where |U1(x)−U2(x)| is minimized, given given that
the two elements of the strategy profile are neighbours. Then x is a Nash
Equilibrium. So a game on any tree has a Nash Equilibrium for two players.
Proof. Let U1(x) ≥ U2(x). Suppose player 1 can increase its utility by moving.
By the previous lemma the vertex with best payoff is a neighbour of player 2.
But the maximum utility of a neighbour of player 2 other than v, is less than
U2(x), by Lemma 4.6.5. We know that U1(x) ≥ U2(x), thus moving cannot
benefit player 1.
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Now suppose that it benefits player 2 to move, U2(x′) > U2(x), then, as every
vertex in the graph is coloured at the end of the diffusion process and there
are no grey vertices, U1(x′) < U1(x).
Case 1: U2(x′) ≥ U1(x)
U2(x′) can colour at most U1(x) − 1 vertices by Lemma 4.6.5, so the above
case cannot occur.
Case 2a: U2(x′) < U1(x), and U1(x′) > U2(x′)
Now, we know that U1(x) > U1(x′), and U2(x′) > U2(x). So U1(x) +U2(x′) >
U1(x′) + U2(x), ie
U1(x)− U2(x) > U1(x′)− U2(x′)
which contradicts our initial assumption, that |U1(x)− U2(x)| is minimized.
Case 2b: U2(x′) < U1(x), and U1(x′) ≤ U2(x′)
The maximum value of U2(x′) is U1(x)− 1 from Lemma 4.6.5, and the mini-
mum value of U1(x′) is U2(x)+1, since player 1 will now colour all the vertices
which player 2 formerly coloured, as well as itself. Then the maximum differ-
ence between the two
max|U2(x′)− U1(x′)| = U1(x)− U2(x)− 2 < U1(x)− U2(x)
which contradicts our initial assumption, that |U1(x)− U2(x)| is minimized.
Then x is a Nash Equilibrium.
In the tree T below there is one Nash Equilibrium, x = (v, w) as shown, where
v has coloured the yellow vertices and w the blue. |U1(x)−U2(x)| = |7−5| = 2
is clearly minimized for v, w neighbours. Every Nash Equilibrium on a tree is
optimal.
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Figure 4.6: The tree T
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CHAPTER 5
Diffusion on the ILT model
5.1 Introduction and Notation
In this chapter we study the information diffusion model of Alon et al on
the Iterated Local Transitivity (ILT) model, both of which were separately
discussed in earlier chapters. In particular, we show that for two competing
players an independent Nash Equilibrium on the initial graph remains a Nash
Equilibrium for all subsequent times. We also describe an example showing
that this conclusion does not hold for general Nash Equilibria in the ILT
process. The graphs we consider are finite and undirected.
5.1.1 The Diffusion Process D
We now provide formal notation for the diffusion process [7] discussed earlier.
Consider a graph G with vertex set V (G), |V (G)| = N and a set of players
indexed as [1, n] = {1, . . . , n}. At time 0, each player i ∈ [1, n] selects a seed
vertex, xi, in V (G), which is labelled (or coloured) i. We shall only consider
strategy profiles in which all of the xi are distinct. If the set {x1, . . . , xn} is
an independent set, we say that the strategy profile x is independent. All
other vertices at time 0 are labelled 0 (corresponding to white vertices in
[7]). In addition to the labels 0, 1, . . . , n we also use the label −1 to denote
grey vertices. In keeping with the original model of [7], grey vertices do not
propagate. For v ∈ V (G) and t ≥ 0, we use lt(v) to denote the label of v at
time t.
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The labelling map l0 is given by
l0(v) =
i if v = xi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n0 otherwise. (5.1)
At each subsequent time t ≥ 1, we define lt as follows. If lt−1(v) 6= 0, then
lt(v) = lt−1(v) (so only vertices labelled 0 can change their label). For vertices
v with lt−1(v) = 0, let L(v) = {lt−1(w) : w ∈ Nv} denote the set of labels of
the neighbours of v. Then:
- if L(v) ∩ [1, n] = {i}, then lt(v) = i;
- if |L(v) ∩ [1, n]| ≥ 2 then lt(v) = −1;
- lt(v) = lt−1(v) otherwise.
For i ∈ [1, n], we denote by Li(t) those vertices labelled i at exactly time t.
Formally Li(t) = {v ∈ V (G) : lt−1(v) = 0, lt(v) = i}. The process terminates
at some time t if Li(t + 1) is empty for all i ∈ [1, n]. Thus no new vertices
are labelled i ∈ {1, . . . n} in the time step t → t + 1. Note however, that it
is possible for vertices to be labelled −1 in the step t → t + 1. As we are
only interested in vertices ultimately labelled i ∈ [1, n], this is unimportant.
Clearly, the process must terminate before time t = N − n.
5.1.2 Iterated Local Transitivity (ILT) Graphs
In [13], the Iterated Local Transitivity (ILT) model for online social networks
was introduced. We have outlined this model in Chapter 3.
5.2 Preliminary Results
We are interested in the following question for the ILT model discussed in
Section 5.1. When does the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in the initial
graph G0 imply the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Gt for all t ≥ 0?
We adopt the following notation. For a connected graph G, Gˆ denotes the
graph obtained through applying one step of the ILT process toG. If a strategy
profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) consists entirely of vertices from V (G), we say that it is
a strategy profile in G. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, t ≥ 0, Lˆi(t) denotes the set of vertices
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in Gˆ labelled i at exactly time t. We also use W (t) (Wˆ (t)) to denote the
white vertices in G (Gˆ) at time t. Formally, W (t) = {v ∈ V (G) : lt(v) = 0}
(Wˆ (t) = {v ∈ V (Gˆ) : lt(v) = 0}).
For a set U ⊆ V (G) (U ⊆ V (Gˆ)), NU (NˆU) denotes the neighbours of U in G
(Gˆ).
Definition 5.2.1. Let a connected graph G, a set of players [1, n] = {1, . . . , n}
and a strategy profile x be given. If the diffusion process D terminates at time
T on G, the utility Ui(x) of player i ∈ [1, n] is given by
Ui(x) = |{v ∈ V (G) : lT (v) = i}|
Informally, the utility of player i is the total number of vertices in G labelled
i when the process terminates. We use Uˆi to denote utilities in Gˆ.
Given a strategy profile x, a vertex v 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn} and i ∈ [1, n], we denote
by x−i(v) the profile given by
x−i(v) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, v, xi+1, . . . xn).
We next recall the definition of Nash Equilibrium.
Definition 5.2.2. Let a connected graph G and a set of players [1, n] =
{1, . . . , n} be given. A strategy profile x is a Nash Equilibrium for the process
D on G if Ui(x) ≥ Ui(x−i(v)) for all i ∈ [1, n] and all v ∈ V (G)\{x1, . . . , xn}.
Note the following simple facts, which follow immediately from the definition
of the process D.
Lemma 5.2.1. A vertex v is in Li(t + 1) if and only if: (i) v ∈ W (t); (ii)
v ∈ NLi(t); (iii) v 6∈ NLj(t) for all j ∈ [1, n]− i.
Lemma 5.2.2. A vertex v is in W (t + 1) if and only if: (i)v ∈ W (t); (ii)
v 6∈ NLj(t) for all j ∈ [1, n].
Proposition 5.2.1. Let (x1, . . . , xn) be a strategy profile in a connected graph
G. Then for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Lˆi(1) =
Li(1) ∪ (Li(1))
′ ∪ {x′i} if x is independent
Li(1) ∪ (Li(1))′ otherwise
.
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Wˆ (1) = W (1) ∪W (1)′.
Proof. Note that Wˆ (0) = W (0) ∪ (W (0))′ ∪ {x′1, . . . , x′n} and that Nˆxj =
N(xj) ∪ (Nxj)′ ∪ {x′j} for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. As x′i ∈ Nˆxj if and only if xi ∈ Nxj , the
result follows readily from Lemma 5.2.1.
The following proposition clarifies the relationship between Lˆi(t) and Li(t) for
t = 2, 3, . . ..
Proposition 5.2.2. Let (x1, . . . , xn) be a strategy profile in a connected graph
G. Then for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, t ≥ 2,
Lˆi(t) = Li(t) ∪ (Li(t))′.
Wˆ (t) = W (t) ∪W (t)′.
Proof. We prove the result by induction on t. First, we use Proposition 5.2.1
to establish the result for the case t = 2. Lemma 5.2.1 implies that a vertex
w ∈ V (Gˆ) is in Lˆi(2) if and only if: w ∈ Wˆ (1); w ∈ NˆLˆi(1); w 6∈ NˆLˆj(1) for
j ∈ [1, n] − i. Using Proposition 5.2.1, we can see that Nˆxi ∩ Wˆ (1) is empty
(this follows from Lemma 5.2.2 as Nˆx′i is given by {xi} ∪Nxi) . Furthermore,
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n
NˆLk(1)∪Lk(1)′ = NˆLk(1) = NLk(1) ∪N ′Lk(1).
It follows from Lemma 5.2.1 that Lˆi(2) = Li(2) ∪ Li(2)′. The conclusion
Wˆ (2) = W (2) ∪W (2)′ follows from Proposition 5.2.1 and Lemma 5.2.2.
Now assume that the result is true for some t ≥ 2. Lemma 5.2.1 implies that
w ∈ Lˆi(t+1) if and only if: w ∈ Wˆ (t); w ∈ NˆLˆi(t); w 6∈ NˆLˆj(t) for j ∈ [1, n]− i.
Using the induction hypothesis we see that for k ∈ [1, n]
NˆLˆk(t) = NˆLk(t)∪Lk(t)′ = NˆLk(t) = NLk(t) ∪N ′Lk(t).
As in the previous paragraph, it follows that
Lˆi(t+ 1) = Li(t+ 1) ∪ (Li(t+ 1))′.
Moreover, combining the induction hypothesis with Lemma 5.2.2 yields Wˆ (t+
1) = W (t+ 1) ∪W (t+ 1)′.
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5.3 Nash Equilibria and the ILT Model
In [7], the existence of Nash equilibria for the diffusion process was investigated
on graphs of low diameter. We shall provide conditions under which such
equilibria are guaranteed to exist for Gt in the ILT model for all t.
The following lemma shows that in the 2-player case, neither player can im-
prove their utility by unilaterally changing from xi to its clone x′i.
Lemma 5.3.1. Let (x1, x2) be a strategy profile in G. Then
Uˆ1(x′1, x2) ≤ Uˆ1(x1, x2).
Proof. We use l¯t to denote the labelling map for the profile (x′1, x2), and lt for
the labelling map for (x1, x2). It is clear that l¯1(v) = 1 implies l1(v) = 1, and
that l1(v) = 2 implies l¯1(v) = 2. Suppose that Uˆ1(x′1, x2) > Uˆ1(x1, x2). Then
there must exist some t > 1 and v such that l¯t(v) = 1, lt(v) 6= 1. Let t0 be
the minimal t > 1 for which this occurs. It is immediate that lt0−1(v) 6= 1.
If t0 − 1 = 1, then this implies that l¯t0−1(v) 6= 1. If t0 − 1 > 1, then as
t0 is minimal, it also follows that l¯t0−1(v) 6= 1. We can thus conclude that
l¯t0−1(v) = 0.
As l¯t0(v) = 1, there is some w1 ∈ Nˆv with l¯t0−1(w1) = 1 and there exists no w ∈
Nv with l¯t0−1(w) = 2. We know that lt0(v) 6= 1 and lt0−1(w1) = 1. It follows
from this that there must exist some w2 ∈ Nˆv with lt0−1(w2) = 2. Moreover,
we know that l¯t0−1(w2) 6= 2. This implies that t0 − 1 > 1. Thus if we define
t1 to be the minimum t > 1 for which there exists u with l¯t(u) 6= 2, lt(u) = 2,
we can see that 1 < t1 < t0. A similar argument to that used above will show
that there must exist some w3 in Nˆu such that lt1−1(w3) 6= 1, l¯t1−1(w3) = 1.
As 1 < t1 < t0 (and this cannot happen for t = 1 so that t1 − 1 > 1), this
contradicts the minimality of t0. This shows that Uˆ1(x′1, x2) ≤ Uˆ1(x1, x2) as
claimed.
The example in Figure 5.1 below shows that the previous result need not
hold for 3 or more players. If x = (v1, v2, v3) and x1 = (v1, v′2, v3), then
Uˆ2(x) < Uˆ2(x′).
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Figure 5.1: Utility increases by choosing clone
The next lemma, which follows from Proposition 5.2.2, shows how the utility
Ui(x) of an player on G relates to its utility Uˆi(x) on Gˆ for a strategy profile
x in G.
Lemma 5.3.2. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be a strategy profile in G. Then
Uˆi(x) =
2Ui(x)− 1 if xi is neighboured by some xj2Ui(x) if xi is not neighboured by some xj
Proof. This result follows immediately from Proposition 5.2.1 and Proposition
5.2.2.
For the remainder of this section, we will use the above result to investigate
the relationship between Nash equilibria on G and Gˆ.
Proposition 5.3.1. Let x = (x1, .., xn) be a strategy profile in G. If x is a
Nash Equilibrium for D in Gˆ then x is also a Nash Equilibrium for D in G.
Proof. For any strategy profile y = (y1, . . . , yn) in G, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let fi(y) ∈
{0, 1} be the indicator function of whether yi neighbours some yj, j 6= i. Let
x0 be a strategy profile x−i(v) for some v ∈ V (G)\{x1, . . . , xn}. As x is a
Nash Equilibrium in Gˆ, we have
2Ui(x0)− fi(x0) = Uˆi(x0) ≤ Uˆi(x) = 2Ui(x)− fi(x).
Rearranging the above inequalities, we see that
Ui(x0) ≤ Ui(x) + fi(x0)− fi(x)2 ≤ Ui(x) +
1
2 .
As both Ui(x0) and Ui(x) are integers, it follows that Ui(x0) ≤ Ui(x). As this
is true for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, v ∈ V (G), it follows that x is a Nash Equilibrium
in G as claimed.
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The previous proposition shows that in order for a strategy profile x selected
from the vertices of G to be a Nash Equilibrium in Gˆ, it is necessary for x to
be a Nash Equilibrium in G. It is tempting to conjecture that the converse
will be true: that any Nash Equilibrium on G will also be a Nash Equilibrium
on Gˆ. The example in Figure 5.2 below shows that this is not true, even for
the simple case of 2 players. Moreover, for this example, the process D has
no Nash Equilibrium on Gˆ.
Figure 5.2: Nash Equilibrium on G, no Nash Equilibrium on Gˆ
Discussion of Example in Figure 5.2
We claim that x = (v1, v2) is a Nash Equilibrium. First note that U1(x) = 8,
U2(x) = 5. If we remove the edge v1v2 then G splits into two connected
components. Let Ci denote the component containing vi for i = 1, 2. Consider
a strategy profile (v, v2) with v 6= v1, v ∈ C1. For such a profile, it is clear that
v1 will either be labelled 2 or −1. In either case, U1(v, v2) ≤ 7. On the other
hand U1(v, v2) = 1 for any v ∈ C2. Thus player 1 cannot improve their utility
by unilaterally changing strategy. Now consider player 2. Again U2(v1, v) = 1
for any v ∈ C2 with v 6= v2. So consider v ∈ C1. By symmetry, it is enough to
consider v ∈ {v3, v4, v5, v8}. For v ∈ {v4, v5, v8}, it is easy to see that vertices
{v6, v7, v9} cannot be labelled 2 so in each of these cases U2(v1, v) ≤ 4. Finally,
U2(v1, v3) = 5. Thus, player 2 cannot unilaterally improve their utility and
(v1, v2) is a Nash Equilibrium as claimed.
Moreover, (v1, v2) is the only Nash Equilibrium in G. Consider any strategy
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profile (x1, x2). If both x1 and x2 are in C2, then one player has utility at
most 1 and this player can increase their utility by changing to v1. On the
other hand, if both x1 and x2 are in C1, then (as v1 will either be labelled i
for some i ∈ {1, 2} or −1), one player will have utility at most |C1|2 = 4, while
their utility would be at least 5 if they change to v2. Therefore, any Nash
Equilibrium (x1, x2) must have one vertex in each component. Without loss
of generality, suppose (x1, x2) is a Nash Equilibrium with x1 ∈ C1, x2 ∈ C2.
We claim that x1 = v1, x2 = v2. Suppose this is not the case. First assume
x1 6= v1. If v1 is labelled 1 (when the process terminates), then player 2 will
improve their utility by changing x2 to v1. On the other hand, if v1 is not
labelled 1, then player 1 will increase their utility by changing to v1. This
shows that x1 = v1. A similar argument shows that x2 = v2 so (v1, v2) is the
only Nash Equilibrium in G as claimed.
The Nash Equilibrium (v1, v2) is not independent so it follows from Lemma
5.3.2 that Uˆ2(v1, v2) = 9. However, for this example, we have seen that
U2(v1, v3) = 5 and as v1v3 6∈ E(G), it follows that Uˆ2(v1, v2) = 10. Thus
(v1, v2) is not a Nash Equilibrium in Gˆ. Using very similar arguments to those
employed above, we can show that any Nash Equilibrium (x1, x2) in Gˆ must
have x1 ∈ {v1, v′1}, x2 ∈ {v2, v′2} or x2 ∈ {v1, v′1}, x1 ∈ {v2, v′2}. Without loss
of generality, consider the former case. For both (v1, v′2), (v′1v′2), the utility
of player 2 is 9; in both cases, the utility of player 2 increases to 10 if they
change their seed vertex to v3. The only remaining possibility for a Nash
Equilibrium is (v′1, v2). In this case, player 2 has utility 10. However, if player
2 changes their seed vertex to v1, we find U2(v′1, v1) = 14 so this is not a Nash
Equilibrium either. Thus we see that Gˆ has no Nash Equilibrium, while G
does.
It is instructive to highlight some key factors involved in the construction of the
above example. First, G has a unique (up to permutation) Nash Equilibrium
(v1, v2) which is not independent, and there exists a vertex v3 6∈ {v1, v2}
with U2(v1, v3) = U2(v1, v2). These conditions imply that (v1, v2) is not a
Nash Equilibrium in Gˆ. The structural properties of G ensuring a unique
Nash Equilibrium, when inherited by Gˆ rule out the possibility of a Nash
Equilibrium existing in Gˆ. Before finishing our discussion here, note that it is
possible for Gˆ to have a Nash Equilibrium even if there exists no independent
Nash Equilibrium on G. To see this, consider a simple line graph G with 4
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vertices V (G) = {v1, . . . , v4}, E(G) = {v1v2, v2v3, v3v4} and two players. The
only Nash Equilibrium are (v2, v3) or (v3, v2). However is is easy to see that
these are again Nash Equilibria on Gˆ.
We now show that an independent Nash Equilibrium for D on G will also be
a Nash Equilibrium for D on Gˆ.
Proposition 5.3.2. If x = (x1, x2) is an independent Nash Equilibrium for
the diffusion process D in G then x is a Nash Equilibrium in Gˆ.
Proof. As x is a Nash Equilibrium in G, we know that for any i ∈ {1, 2},
v ∈ V (G)\{x1, x2},
Ui(x−i(v)) ≤ Ui(x). (5.2)
As x1x2 /∈ E(G), we can conclude from Lemma 5.3.2 that
Uˆi(x) = 2Ui(x) (5.3)
Furthermore, it follows from Lemma 5.3.2 that Uˆi(x−i(v)) ≤ 2Ui(x−i(v)) so
we can immediately conclude from (5.2) and (5.3) that
Uˆi(x−i(v)) ≤ Uˆi(x). (5.4)
To complete the proof, note that for w = v′, where v ∈ V (G), we know from
Lemma 5.3.1 that
Uˆi(x−i(w)) ≤ Uˆi(x−i(v)).
Combining this with the previous arguments, we see that for any v ∈ V (Gˆ)\{x1, x2},
Ui(x−i(v)) ≤ Uˆi(x).
This completes the proof.
The above result immediately yields the following conclusion concerning the
ILT model.
Corollary 5.3.1. Consider the ILT graph model with a connected initial graph
G0. Consider the diffusion process D corresponding to a set of players {1, 2}.
If there exists an independent Nash Equilibrium x = (x1, x2) for D on G0,
then there exists a Nash Equilibrium for D (with players {1, 2}) on Gt for all
t ≥ 0.
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Figure 5.3: Independent Nash Equilibrium on G that is not a Nash Equilib-
rium on Gˆ
As a final point, we note that as in the case of Lemma 5.3.1, the situation
becomes more complicated when we consider three or more players. In Figure
5.3, the rectangles represent a large collection of leaves (vertices of degree 1).
Assume that a represents 20 leaves, and that there are 3 players. There is a
Nash Equilibrium at x = (v1, v3, v4) in G. However, it can be verified that
this is not a Nash Equilibrium in Gˆ. In fact, Uˆ2(v1, v′2, v4) > Uˆ2(v1, v3, v4), and
x2 = (v1, v′2, v4) is a Nash Equilibrium.
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Potential Games
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss a topic that is related to the work of previous
chapters. We consider the existence of potential functions for the competitive
information diffusion model on the ILT graph. Potential functions are an
important concept in game theory. A game is said to be a potential game
if the incentive of all players to change their strategy can be expressed using
a single global function called the potential function. The potential function
can be used to analyze the equilibrium properties of games, as the payoffs of
all players are mapped into one function, and the set of pure Nash equilibria
can be found by locating the local optima of the potential function.
6.2 Definitions
Let x1, x2 be two strategy profiles such that x1 = (a1, .., an) and x2 =
(a1, .., as−1, v, as+1, ..) where v 6= am for m ∈ {1, .., n}. We introduce some
definitions from Monderer and Shapley’s seminal paper [41]. A finite strategic
game Γ is an exact potential game if there exists a potential function such that
for every player i ∈ {1, .., n} and for all pairs x1, x2
Ui(x1)− Ui(x2) = φ(x1)− φ(x2)
Γ is an ordinal potential game if there exists a potential function such that for
every player i ∈ {1, .., n} and for all x1, x2
Ui(x1)− Ui(x2) > 0⇔ φ(x1)− φ(x2) > 0
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Γ is a general ordinal potential game if there exists a potential function such
that for every player i ∈ {1, .., n} and for all x1, x2
Ui(x1)− Ui(x2) > 0⇒ φ(x1)− φ(x2) > 0
A path on the set of strategy profiles is a sequence γ = (x1,x2, ..) such that
for every k ≥ 1 xk,xk−1 differ in exactly one element. A path (x1,x2, ..) is an
improvement path if for all k ≥ 2 ;Ui(xk) > Ui(xk−1) where xk and xk−1 differ
in the ith element. A game has the finite improvement property (FIP) if every
improvement path is finite.
A useful result from [41] is that a game Γ has the FIP if and only if Γ has a
generalized ordinal potential.
6.3 Potential Games on the ILT model
Consider again the game theoretic model of information diffusion on the ILT
model. Following on from our work in the previous chapter, we consider the
following general question. If there exists a potential function for the game on
a graph G, does this imply that there exists one on Gˆ. First let’s examine a
simple example. Consider the graph G in Figure 6.1 below. We now establish
the existence of a potential function φ on the graph G below.
Figure 6.1: Graph G
Let
Mxi = {v : d(xi, v) = 1, v /∈ x, d(xj, v) 6= 1 ∀ i 6= j}
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and let the potential function be φ(x) = |
3⋃
i=1
Mxi |
If x1 and x2 are strategy profiles for three players differing only in element i,
then
Ui(x1) > Ui(x2)⇒ φ(x1) > φ(x2)
here. The maximum value of φ is φmax(x) = 3 which occurs only at the Nash
Equilibria, which exist on the strategy profiles (3, 5, 6), (2, 3, 5) and (1, 3, 5).
Figure 6.2: Graph Gˆ
As before Gˆ denotes the graph G after applying one step of the ILT process.
We wish to see if there is a simple relation between the potential function
φ on G and φˆ on Gˆ. We try a simple candidate potential function, which
unfortunately fails to work.
Let
φˆ(x) = φ(Π(x))
where Π(x) = Π(x1, ., xn) = (pi(x1), .., pi(xn)), and for all v ∈ V (Gˆ) pi(v) maps
v to a vertex in V (G)
pi(v) =
w if v = w
′ for some w ∈ V (G)
v if v ∈ V (G)
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If φˆ is a generalized ordinal potential for a game on Gˆ then
Ui(x1)− Ui(x2) > 0⇒ φ(x1)− φ(x2) > 0
for every player i ∈ {1, .., n} and for all x1, x2 such that x1 and x2 are strategy
profiles differing only in element i.
However, if we choose strategy profiles x1 = (5, 10, 12) and x2 = (8, 10, 12),
then Uˆ1(x1) = 7, Uˆ1(x2) = 2, and φˆ(x1) = 0, φˆ(x2) = 0, thus
Uˆ1(x1) > Uˆ1(x2) but φˆ(x1) = φˆ(x2)
So φˆ is not a general ordinal potential on Gˆ.
In general it is difficult to relate potential functions on G to potential functions
on Gˆ. However, the following simple fact does hold.
Lemma 6.3.1. If there exists a generalized ordinal potential on Gˆ then there
exists a generalized ordinal potential on G.
Proof. Let φˆ be a generalized ordinal potential function on Gˆ. We try to
construct a generalized ordinal potential φ on G. We define φ(v1, .., vn) =
φˆ(v1, .., vn) where vi ∈ V (G) for all i. Now for x such that xi ∈ V (G) for all i,
Uˆi(x) =
2Ui(x)− 1 if xi is neighboured by some xj2Ui(x) if xi is not neighboured by some xj
so for all x2 such that x2 is a strategy profile on G and x differs from x2 only
in element i,
Ui(x2) > Ui(x)⇒ Uˆi(x2) > Uˆi(x)
We know that
Uˆi(x2) > Uˆi(x)⇒ φˆ(x2) > φˆ(x)
thus
Ui(x2) > Ui(x)⇒ φ(x2) > φ(x)
So if there exists a generalized ordinal potential on Gˆ then there exists a
generalized ordinal potential on G.
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This is equivalent to the next lemma.
Lemma 6.3.2. If Gˆ has the FIP then G has the FIP, and thus has a gener-
alized ordinal potential.
Proof. Let x1, x2 be strategy profiles where all the elements of x1 and x2 are
elements of G, and the profiles only differ in element i. Suppose that in Gˆ
Uˆi(x1) > Uˆi(x2). Then in G it is the case that Ui(x1) ≥ Ui(x2), since
Uˆi(x) =
2Ui(x)− 1 if xi is neighboured by some xj2Ui(x) if xi is not neighboured by some xj
Thus if an improvement path terminates in Gˆ clearly it will terminate in G.
If Gˆ has the FIP then every improvement path in Gˆ will terminate. Since in
this case every improvement path in G is finite, G has the FIP.
We define a loop here as a sequence of strategy profiles x1,x2, ..xz such that
xi, xi+1 differ in exactly one element for all i ∈ 1, .., z − 1.
Uk(xi) < Uk(xj)
Lemma 6.3.3. A game has a loop if and only if it does not have a general
ordinal potential.
Proof. If a loop exists, a potential game cannot exist since for some sequence
of uniquely deviating strategy profiles, with x1 = xz
φ(xz) > φ(xz−1) > .. > φ(x1)
but x1 = xz, so the graph has no general ordinal potential game.
If there are no loops in any improvement path in the game Γ, then every
improvement path must be finite if the number of vertices is finite, since the
path cannot then be longer than the number of strategy profiles on the graph.
Any maximal finite improvement path ends in a Nash Equilibrium, so the
graph must have a Nash Equilibrium. Also since a graph has the FIP if and
only if it has a generalized ordinal potential then Γ must be a general ordinal
potential game.
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If a game on a graph is path independent then there is at most one improve-
ment path between any two strategy profiles. Path independence implies that
no loop exists, but not vice versa, as there could be two improvement paths
of different lengths with the same initial and final vertices.
Lemma 6.3.4. Every improvement path in G will be an improvement path in
Gˆ.
Proof. Let K be the set of all improvement paths in G, and K ′ be the set of
these paths in Gˆ. For every path (x1,x2, ..) ∈ K, Ui(xk) > Ui(xk−1) for k > 1
where xk and xk−1 differ in the ith element. Then, since
(∗) Uˆi(x) =
2Ui(x)− 1 if xi is neighboured by some xj2Ui(x) if xi is not neighboured by some xj
we have that
Uˆi(xk) > Uˆi(xk−1) for k > 1
The following lemma contains an example of a graph G in which every im-
provement path is finite, but has an improvement path in Gˆ which is not finite.
Thus there may be new improvement paths in Gˆ which are not finite.
Lemma 6.3.5. A game with a N.E. in G and Gˆ, and which has an exact
potential game in G does not necessarily have a generalized potential game in
Gˆ. This also shows that a game with a N.E. in G and Gˆ, and which has a
generalized ordinal potential game in G does not necessarily have a generalized
ordinal potential game in Gˆ.
Figure 6.3: Graph G
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Proof. To show that the graph G in Figure 6.3 has an exact potential game, we
must show that there exists a potential function φ such that for every player
i ∈ {1, .., n} and for all pairs of strategy profiles x1, x2 which only differ in
the ith element
Ui(x1)− Ui(x2) = φ(x1)− φ(x2)
If we use the potential function
φ = |
3⋃
i=1
Nxi |
where:
Nxi = {v : d(xi, v) = 1}
we can show that the game has an exact potential game on G by checking
every possible deviation from a starting strategy profile.
x1 = {1, 2} → {1, 3} = x2, Ui(x1)− Ui(x2) = 2− 1, φ(x1)− φ(x2) = 3− 2
x1 = {1, 2} → {3, 2} = x2, Ui(x1)− Ui(x2) = 1− 1, φ(x1)− φ(x2) = 3− 3
x1 = {1, 3} → {2, 3} = x2, Ui(x1)− Ui(x2) = 1− 2, φ(x1)− φ(x2) = 2− 3
We construct a directed graph where the vertices of the graph are strategy
profiles. A directed edge is drawn from between two vertices if and only if
unilaterally changing the vertex to which an agent is assigned in the strategy
profile will result in an increase in utility for this agent.
Figure 6.4: Graph of all strategy profiles for G
The numbered vertices in Figure 2 below represent the strategy profiles as
follows:
1 = (1, 2), 2 = (1, 3), 3 = (2, 3)
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So as we can see from Figure 2 all the improvement paths are finite, and
terminate at the Nash Equilibria (1, 2) and (2, 3). Therefore the game on G
has the finite improvement property and has a generalized ordinal potential
game.
Figure 6.5: Gˆ
The game on Gˆ has no potential game, since we can construct an infinite
improvement path out of the following sequence of strategy profiles:
{1, 6} → {3, 6} → {3, 4} → {1, 4} → {1, 6}
The fact that Gˆ has no potential game can also be seen from the graph of
strategy profiles for Gˆ below. The Nash Equilibrium in G remains a Nash
Equilibrium in Gˆ. This is then an example of a graph with a Nash equilibrium
but no potential game. The numbered vertices in Figure 4 represent the
strategy profiles as follows:
1 = (1, 2), 2 = (1, 3), 3 = (1, 4), 4 = (1, 5), 5 = (1, 6), 6 = (2, 3)7 = (2, 4), 8 = (2, 5)
9 = (2, 6), 10 = (3, 4), 11 = (3, 5), 12 = (3, 6), 13 = (4, 5), 14 = (4, 6), 15 = (5, 6)
76
6.3. Potential Games on the ILT model
1
2
3
4
5
6789
10
11
12
13
14
15
Pajek
Figure 6.6: Graph of all strategy profiles for Gˆ
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions
Motivated by the importance of information dissemination on modern online
social networks, we have studied a competitive diffusion process on the iterated
local transitivity model.
Chapters 2 and 3 provided some background on graph models, properties of
graphs, and online social network models. Chapter 3 introduced the iterated
local transitivity model which we used later in the thesis. In chapter 4 various
models for games played on networks were examined. We studied a model for
competitive information diffusion on star graphs, cliques and trees, and we
provided conditions for the existence of Nash Equilibria on these. We have
shown that the model of competitive information diffusion studied in [7], [50]
always admits a Nash Equilibrium on a tree when the number of agents is two.
While trees are a restrictive class of graphs, they can serve as an idealisation
of hierarchical structures that arise in many social networks. Identifying other
structures which guarantee the existence of a Nash Equilibrium and character-
ising these when they exist remains a challenging question for future research.
The model for competitive information diffusion was studied in detail for the
iterated local transitivity model in chapter 5. Specifically, we have studied
the model [13] for two competing agents and shown that an independent Nash
Equilibrium on the initial graph G0 will remain a N.E. for all t > 0. We
have also described a counterexample to illustrate that this will not hold for
non-independent Nash Equilibria. We showed that if two competing agents
select an independent equilibrium strategy at some time, then neither of them
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can benefit from unilaterally changing their strategy at any subsequent time
in the evolution of the underlying network. This suggests that, in this case
the alterations in the underlying social network do not effect the dynamics of
the game. It would be interesting to test the extent to which this conclusion
holds for real social networks, for which time-course data can be obtained.
We discussed potential games in chapter 6 and their existence on the iterated
local transitivity model.
The work here can be viewed as a starting point for a significant programme on
the timely topic of information diffusion on social networks. There are several
possible ways to extend our results. These include investigating alternative
models of information diffusion and rumour spread [19], on the ILT model in
the spirit in which epidemic models have been analysed on graphical models
recently [27], [20]. It would also be interesting to investigate the possibility
of obtaining similar results for the diffusion process on the stochastic ILT
models described in [13] or on other models of online social networks such as
Kronecker graph models [34].
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